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BAKER'S PROMISE, EQUAL PROTECTION,
AND THE MODERN REDISTRICTING
REVOLUTION: A PLEA FOR RATIONALITY
LUIS FUENTES-ROHWER*
The conventional wisdom contends that Baker v. Carr did not set
down a standard for lower courts to follow. This Article responds
to this position. It reaches three conclusions. First, it argues the
implicit promise of Baker v. Carr pointed toward a loose, flexible
rationality standard for deciding redistricting controversies.
Under this approach, states were given much room to enact
redistricting plans in accordance to their states' particular needs.
Second, the lower courts applied precisely this standard in
litigation in the wake of Baker, and did so quite capably. This
conclusion responds to those who exhort the imposition of a rigid
equipopulation standard in redistricting. The third conclusion is
normative in scope. In essence, this Article sides with those who
exalt the virtues of standards over rules. Particularly in the
redistricting context, this Article concludes that equal protection
principles must point toward flexible standards, toward heightened
rationality review, and away from an inflexible straightjacket. Put
differently, this is to say that the Court got it exactly right in Baker,
even in Reynolds v. Sims. In time, however, the Court failed to
live up to Baker's implicit promise.
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EPILOGUE: THE COURT STRIKES BACK ........................................... 1408
In his dissenting opinion in Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw I),1 Justice
Stevens repeated his oft-stated contention that the racial
gerrymandering cases do not involve traditional constitutional
harms-harms to individuals-but instead involve objections to the
way that individual states have chosen to balance their competing
political interests.2 This position led him to the conclusion that the
Court must abandon the redistricting field. As Justice Stevens wrote,
1. 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
2. 517 U.S. at 918 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
929 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Miller, 515 U.S. at 934 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 679 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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[w]hen a federal court is called upon, as it is here, to parse
among varying legislative choices about the political
structure of a State, and when the litigant's claim ultimately
rests on "a difference of opinion as to the function of
representative government," rather than a claim of
discriminatory exclusion, there is reason for pause
For support, Justice Stevens offered Justice Frankfurter's opinion for
the Court in Colegrove v. Green4 and Justice Harlan's dissent in Baker
v. Carr.5
In response, and as expected, commentators have objected to
Justice Stevens's choice of supporting case law. This response draws
its inner strength from the passage of time and the reception accorded
to the post-Baker line of cases. As John Hart Ely, one such critic, put
this point: "Frankly, I wouldn't have anticipated the necessity of this
reminder, but Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims ... , controversial
as they may have seemed at the time ... , are now conventionally
recognized... as among the Court's more legitimate and successful
interventions, the Frankfurter and Harlan opinions as well-intended
but short-sighted."6
These two positions stand at the core of this Article's thesis. To
begin, I recognize the allure of the one-person, one-vote principle,
which "has now been sanctified by history."'7  It is also true that
3. Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 922-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 333 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); see Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 117 (1997)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The decision.., increases the risk of significant judicial
entanglement in the inherently political redistricting process.").
4. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
5. 369 U.S. at 333 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
6. John Hart Ely, Standing to Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders, 111 HARv. L.
REv. 576, 577 n.7 (1997). What Ely means by "short-sighted" in this context, I cannot say.
7. Bernard Grofman, Toward a Coherent Theory of Gerrymandering: Bandemer
and Thornburg, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 29, 57 (Bernard
Grofman ed., 1990) ("It has now been sanctified by history, and is generally regarded as a
resounding success."). This point has been made often. See Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The
Warren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail of "One Man-One Vote," 1969 SuP. Cr. REV.
219, 268 (" 'One man-one vote' should be perceived as the symbol of an aspiration for
fairness, for avoidance of complexity, for intelligibility in our representational process-
indeed, for a sense of meaningful membership in the polis."); Bernard Grofman &
Howard A. Scarrow, Current Issues in Reapportionment, 4 LAW & POL'Y Q. 435, 438
(1982) ("[T]he doctrine of 'one person, one vote' has been elevated to the status of moral
platitude."); C. Herman Pritchett, Equal Protection and the Urban Majority, 58 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 869, 872 (1964) ("I believe that [one person, one vote] comes closer to
summarizing current notions of democracy in representation than any other."); id. ("[T]he
history of democratic institutions points compellingly in the direction of population as the
only legitimate basis of representation today.") (quoting One Man, One Vote, THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND 4 (1962)).
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federal courts have played a leading role in voting rights controversies
for quite some time and, as such, the mere mention of a lessened
judicial role in this area is sure to ruffle many feathers. And yet, in
light of present circumstances, I remain troubled by the modem
judicial approach to questions of democratic theory and electoral
politics. To put it mildly, the Court's aggressive pursuit of
idiosyncratic notions of political fairness has led to much uncertainty.8
Pam Karlan stated this point well, in looking ahead to the 2000 census
and the state of the doctrine: "The only safe predictions are that the
courts will become increasingly embroiled in battles over the
distribution of political power and that their contradictory
interventions will profoundly alter, in unforeseen and sometimes
perverse ways, the terrain on which the next round of political battles
will be fought." 9
This state of affairs raises important questions about the role of
federal courts in matters of electoral politics. These are long-standing
questions for which definitive answers are unavailing. Those looking
for the competing arguments about the proper role of federal courts
in elections would do well to turn to the Court's opinion in Baker v.
Carr. At one end of the continuum one finds the "political question"
crowd, for whom the courts should contribute very little, if anything
at all.1° The other end is occupied by those who believe in aggressive
court intervention of the type we have come to experience in the
wake of Baker." This Article focuses on the gray area between these
two polar ends. It is here where we find Baker's doctrinal promise.1
2
8. To be clear, this passage does not refer to the one-person, one-vote revolution
post-Baker. The clarity of this rule is, to many, its virtue. Rather, I have in mind the
Court's spate of cases after the 1990 redistricting, begun with Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993). This line of cases is misguided at best and quite confusing, especially to those in
charge of the redistricting process. See Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial
and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2505 (1996) (contending that the Supreme
Court's racial redistricting doctrine "teeters on the brink of legal incoherence and political
chaos"). To my mind, and as I argue elsewhere, the Court has pushed the doctrine much
further than necessary. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Genymandering, 'Fair Representation,'
and Equal Protection: An Exegesis into the Judicial Role (draft on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
9. Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50
STAN. L. REV. 731,733 (1998).
10. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 266 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 330 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). For a recent analysis of the doctrine, see Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme
Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial
Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237 (2002).
11. See John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, 50 STAN L.
REV. 607 passim (1998).
12. Cf. Abner J. Mikva, Justice Brennan and the Political Process: Assessing the
Legacy of Baker v. Carr, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 697 ("Defects in the political process
1356 [Vol. 80
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In Baker, the Court spent most of its time justifying its
conclusion about the justiciability of redistricting questions. When it
came to the question of guidance, however, a cursory look at the
opinion leads to the immediate view that the Court did not provide
much. This conclusion comports with conventional wisdom, which
argues that the Court did not establish a standard to guide lower
courts in the litigation following in Baker's wake. 3 Rather, it simply
forced lower courts to develop a standard, that is, to decide the cases
before them in accordance with their understandings of what an equal
protection violation might look like. 4
sometimes call for judicial involvement, but, just as clearly, the complexities of the
political process should limit the role judges play in it.").
13. See WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 370 U.S. 190, 194 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("It is
unfortunate that the Court, now for the second time, has remanded a case of this kind
without first coming to grips itself with this basic constitutional issue, or even indicating
any guidelines for decision in the lower courts. Baker v. Carr... of course did neither.");
Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471, 476 (D. Colo. 1962) ("No guidelines or criteria are
laid down for determining the extent or level of disproportion necessary to constitute
infringement of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Md.
Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 184 A.2d 715,719-20 (Md. 1962), rev'd, 377 U.S.
656 (1964); ROYCE HANSON, THE POLITICAL THICKET: REAPPORTIONMENT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 116 (1966); Jerold Israel, On Charting a Course Through
the Mathematical Quagmire: The Future of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REV. 107, 108
(1962) ("Nowhere does the Court indicate, by dictum or otherwise, what standards might
be used in determining the validity of an apportionment scheme which creates such
inequalities."); see also Robert G. McCloskey, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term-Foreword.-
The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARv. L. REv. 54, 55 (1962) ("[T]he Supreme Court [in
Baker] offered the lower court no standards by which the decision should be reached and
no hints about the remedy that might be appropriate if the plaintiffs prevailed."); Michael
W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 106 (2000) ("As an interpretation of the political question
doctrine, this was nonsense. At the time of Baker, the Equal Protection Clause had never
been applied to the districting question, and there were any number of possible
interpretations, with no judicially manageable means of choosing among them.").
The Court repeated this theme in Reynolds v. Sims, where it wrote that "[w]e
intimated no view as to the proper constitutional standards for evaluating the validity of a
state legislative apportionment scheme." 377 U.S. 533, 556 (1964). This is a criticism of
judicial review of legislative redistricting in general. See Dean Alfange, Jr.,
Gerrymandering and the Constitution: Into the Thorns of the Thicket at Last, 1986 SuP.
Cr. REV. 175, 211-12 (explaining that the hard question in political gerrymandering cases
is that of standards); cf. Charles L. Black, Inequities in Districting for Congress: Baker v.
Carr and Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE LJ. 13, 14-15 (1962) (arguing that the question of
remedies poses a complex problem in redistricting cases).
14. During the conference after the second oral argument in Baker, Chief Justice
Warren remarked: "I would reverse solely on jurisdiction, and leave the rest of the case
and the form of decree to the district court. I would not at this time say what decree
should be entered, although I would suggest certain guidelines." THE SUPREME COURT
IN CONFERENCE, 1940-1985: THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 847 (Dell Dickson ed., 2000) [hereinafter PRIVATE
DISCUSSIONS]; see Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578 ("Lower courts can and assuredly will work
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And that, in a nutshell, is Baker's promise. In particular, this
Article argues that lower courts were given the proper room after
Baker to decide redistricting questions in accordance with their
particular views about rationality and arbitrariness. For example,
many courts applied a rationality test,I5 some looked to the
equipopulation principle, 16 and others looked to the federal analogy
for approval (for example, one of two legislative houses is
apportioned on the basis of population). 7 In so doing, these courts
decentralized what is at best a complex issue. This is as it should be."8
out more concrete and specific standards for evaluating state legislative apportionment
schemes in the context of actual litigation."); see also Brief of the United States as Amicus
Curiae, reprinted in 56 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 279, 338 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard
Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS] ("Since the substantive issue is
complex in itself, we do not believe that it should be determined initially by this Court.
We think that the case should be remanded to the three-judge court for a full and detailed
examination of this question."); Jo Desha Lucas, Legislative Apportionment and
Representative Government: The Meaning of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REV. 711, 803
(1963) (contending that the Court "tortured the precedents beyond recognition and,
without giving any guiding principles, invited the district courts to entertain the welter of
suits it must have anticipated"); cf. Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The New
Doctrine of Judicial Intervention and its Implications for American Federalism, 29 U. CHI.
L. REV. 673,691 (1962) ("[T]he absence of standards cannot be taken to imply simply that
federal and state courts are free to devise their own measures. Rather it suggests that the
pattern of deference to the states in most areas of contemporary federalism is inapplicable
to the apportionment problem.").
15. See, e.g., Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229 F. Supp. 754, 764 (D. Conn. 1964);
Germano v. Kerner, 220 F. Supp. 230, 237 (N.D. Ill. 1963), rev'd, 378 U.S. 560 (1964);
Alsup v. Mayhall, 208 F. Supp. 713, 716 (S.D. Ala. 1962); Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp.
885,891 (W.D. Okla. 1962); Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341,345 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
16. See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 435, 438 (S.D. Ala. 1964); Bush v. Martin,
224 F. Supp. 499,512 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
17. See, e.g., Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 184 A.2d 715,718-19 (Md.
1962), rev'd, 377 U.S. 656 (1964).
18. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964) ("Lower courts can and assuredly
will work out more concrete and specific standards for evaluating state legislative
apportionment schemes in the context of actual litigation."); Robert B. McKay, Political
Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MICH. L. REV. 645,
650 (1963) ("Nor is there anything novel in announcing for the first time a new proposition
of constitutional doctrine and leaving its implementation for future development on a
case-by-case basis."); id. at 681 ("The forum for testing [the question of standards] is, and
will continue to be, as the Supreme Court intended,... state and lower federal courts; and
considerable wisdom emerges from their separate encounters with the almost infinite
variety of individual apportionment formulas."); cf. Friedelbaum, supra note 14, at 698-99
(contending that the Supreme Court must move slowly in this area). But see Lucas, supra
note 14, at 802-03 ("There have been almost as many views of what equal treatment is as
there have been courts which have considered the matter, and frequently the members of
a single court had widely diverging views."). For a defense of the use of "nonformalistic
law.., as an invitation to courts to participate actively and consciously in the law's
ongoing development," see Mark D. Rosen, Nonformalistic Law in Time and Space, 66 U.
A PLEA FOR RATIONALITY
For one, it is a sensible reading of Baker v. Carr. More importantly,
this is a logical extension of equal protection principles into the
redistricting area. In taking this position, I contend that rational basis
review is the proper standard for redistricting questions. 19
This Article is divided into four Parts. The first Part looks with
particular care to Baker v. Carr and analyzes the Court's passage
about equal protection standards in light of the facts at issue. This
analysis pays particular attention to the internal debate within the
Supreme Court and the many conferences and discussions that led to
the institutional reversal on redistricting questions. Not surprisingly
in light of their public stances both in Baker and subsequent
redistricting cases, Justices Stewart and Clark play a very important
role here.
The second Part offers a preliminary defense of rationality
review in the redistricting context. It does so in two ways. The first
section looks to the theoretical contours of this position. As part of
this argument, this section posits a defense, albeit a preliminary and
cautious one, for considering the notion of incumbency protection as
a legitimate state interest. The second section moves away from the
redistricting context and into the realm of administrative law. This is
an area where the statutory language codifies the same "arbitrary and
CHi. L. REV. 622, 624 (1999). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REV. 6, 6 (1996) ("Frequently judges decide no more than they
have to decide. They leave things open. They make deliberate decisions about what
should be left unsaid. This practice is pervasive: doing and saying as little as necessary to
justify an outcome.").
19. This places me in the company of Rick Hasen, who extols the benefits of
unmanageability in the redistricting context. Richard L. Hasen, The Benefits of "Judicially
Unmanageable" Standards in Election Cases Under the Equal Protection Clause, 80 N.C. L.
REV. 1469 (2002); see Anthony Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts,
71 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1086 (1958) (noting that courts should employ an equal
protection test in the redistricting context and that such a test would involve a
presumption that the challenged plan was constitutional "[b]ut once the plaintiff had made
a prima facie showing of inequality beyond a reasonable legislative discretion, as a
practical matter the burden would be on the state to show a rational, nondiscriminatory
basis for the apportionment"); Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for
Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 75
(1985) ("Redistricting should be one of the objects of the political struggle, not one of its
ground rules."); cf. Black, supra note 13, at 17 ("Whatever standards may emerge, state or
federal, it seems they cannot be precise or absolute; 'reasonable' departures from equality
will be permitted. The law of the subject will most likely be a law of the permissibility and
impermissibility of such departures."); Mikva, supra note 12, at 688 ("[J]udges should
refrain from applying even judicially manageable standards beyond the point at which
they no longer are 'politically meaningful'-that is, beyond the point where no articulable
defect in the political process calls for judicial involvement.").
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capricious" standard to which the Court refers in Baker. The analogy
proves instructive.
The third Part examines the lower courts and their interpretation
of the Baker standard. For those unfamiliar with the historical
record, this Part proffers a surprising story. In a nutshell, it is clear
lower courts were able to decide redistricting questions effectively
after Baker, thus suggesting that future redistricting cases could be
decided in a manner that preserves court review while limiting court
interference to the most serious cases. In light of recent
misadventures in redistricting,20 I think of the historical account
instead as hopeful. Finally, the fourth Part places the spotlight back
on the Supreme Court and in particular its second wave of cases post-
Baker. This Part contrasts the Court's handling of redistricting
questions vis-h-vis the lower courts' handling of such questions. This
Part sides with Justice Clark in concluding that the Court took its
redistricting mission too far. Baker's promise need not have led down
that road.
I. POLITICAL QUESTIONS, MALAPPORTIONMENT, AND THE GHOST
OF COLEGROVE: BAKER V. CARR
Dating back to the early 1860s, the Tennessee Constitution
directed the reapportionment of both the state house and senate
every ten years, following the census of qualified voters within the
state2 And yet, the legislature had refused to reapportion itself since
the Act of 1901.1 The legislators' refusal was obviously self-serving.
After all, a legislator's main priority is securing reelection, and the
crafting of new lines throws much unnecessary uncertainty into the
process. So it is in their best interest to leave the lines alone.
However, migrations to urban centers from rural areas within the
state had rendered these lines obsolete, perhaps arbitrary. In this
way, population disparities among districts grew to unseemly levels 33
20. In particular, I have in mind the recent Shaw line of cases. See Pamela S. Karlan,
Just Politics? Five Not So Easy Pieces of the 1995 Term, 34 Hous. L. REv. 289 passim
(1997).
21. TENN. CONST. art. II, §§ 4,5,6 (1870).
22. TNN. LAWS 1901, ch. 122.
23. Looking to the raw numbers in the early 1960s presents a pretty clear picture. The
numbers were skewed in many parts of the country. In Georgia, for example, the largest
congressional district had a population of 823,680 while the smallest district had only
271,154. In Texas, the largest district had a population of 951,527, the smallest 216,371. In
Illinois, the factual setting of Colegrove v. Green, the largest district had a population of
914,053, the smallest only 112,116. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 569-70 ("Legislative
apportionment in Alabama is signally illustrative and symptomatic of the seriousness of
this problem in a number of the States. At the time this litigation was commenced, there
1360 [Vol. 80
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In previous years, reformers in Tennessee had brought this
particular complaint to the courts, only to be rebuffed by their own
state Supreme Court.24 The arguments offered by the state court here
were unsurprisingly similar to those penned by Justice Frankfurter in
Colegrove v. Green. This was the classic "political thicket," where
residents of malapportioned districts were advised to take their
complaints to their state legislatures, or to invoke "the ample powers
of Congress."5 A short time later, and as expected, the U.S. Supreme
Court dismissed their case. As then understood, the relevant
precedent was squarely against intervention.2 6
The Tennessee reformers were discouraged, and they should
have been; however, a decision in Minnesota soon after their initial
defeat reinvigorated their efforts. In Magraw v. Donovan, a three-
judge panel held that, contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in
Colegrove v. Green, it had jurisdiction "because of the federal
constitutional issue asserted."'27 The court did not grant the requested
relief, in order to give the state legislature an opportunity to perform
their duty under the state constitution. It did retain jurisdiction,
however, in order to give litigants a chance to return to court were the
Minnesota legislature unwilling to act.
On the strength of Magraw v. Donovan, the Tennessee reformers
began to build a second challenge to their state and congressional
districts. This second time, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately
had been no reapportionment of seats in the Alabama Legislature for over 60 years.");
GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION,
POLITICAL POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT 24-41 (1966); GENE GRAHAM, ONE
MAN, ONE VOTE: BAKER V. CARR AND THE AMERICAN LEVELLERS 23 (1972); Harold
M. Stanley & Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on American Politics 1999-2000, at 74-75
(2000).
24. Kidd v. McCanless, 292 S.W.2d 40,44 (Tenn. 1956), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 920
(1956).
25. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,556 (1946).
26. See, e.g., Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959) (mem.), affig 179 F. Supp. 470
(N.D. Ind. 1959); Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958) (mem.); Radford v. Gary, 352
U.S. 991 (1957) (mem.), affig 145 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956); Kidd v. McCanless, 352
U.S. 920 (1956) (mem.), dismissing appeal from 292 S.W.2d 40 (Tenn. 1956); Cox v. Peters,
342 U.S. 936 (1952) (mem.), dismissing appeal from 67 S.E.2d 579 (Ga. 1951); Tedesco v.
Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 339 U.S. 940 (1950) (mem.), dismissing appeal from 43 So.
2d 514 (La. Ct. App. 1949); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948) (per curiam),
overruled in part by Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S.
804 (1947) (mem.); Turman v. Duckworth, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) (mem.), affg 68 F. Supp.
744 (N.D. Ga. 1946); Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) (mem.), dismissing appeal from
68 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Ga. 1946).
27. Magraw v. Donovan, 163 F. Supp. 184,187 (D. Minn. 1958).
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changed its collective mind. This Part explores the dynamics of this
change as well as the basis for the Court's newfound wisdom.
A. The Case in Court and Justice Clark's Change of Heart
On November 23, 1959, a three-judge federal district court heard
arguments on Baker v. Carr. Less than a month later, a unanimous
court returned with the expected answer.
The question of the distribution of political strength for
legislative purposes has been before the Supreme Court of
the United States on numerous occasions. From a review of
these decisions there can be no doubt that the federal rule,
as enunciated and applied by the Supreme Court, is that the
federal courts, whether from a lack of jurisdiction or from
the inappropriateness of the subject matter for judicial
consideration, will not intervene in cases of this type to
compel legislative reapportionment.28
The plaintiffs pressed on, and this time, on November 21, 1960, the
U.S. Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. This section
analyzes the Court's internal deliberations and coalition building that
led to the opinion of March 26, 1962. These moves within the Court
illustrate the myriad difficulties facing the Court at this time. They
also help explain the structure of the Court's opinion and the ultimate
doctrinal resolution of the Baker litigation.
From the time it reached the high court, the outcome of the case
was hotly contested. At the conference following the first oral
arguments, on April 20, Justice Frankfurter argued passionately
against court intervention. 9 At this stage, Justices Clark and Harlan
sided with him. On the opposite side of the ledger stood Justices
Douglas and Black, dissenters in Colegrove, Justice Brennan and the
Chief Justice.3' Justice Whittaker sided with this camp yet refused to
join a simple majority of five Justices. This placed the onus on Justice
Stewart, who ultimately pressed to schedule the case for reargument
28. Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824, 826 (M.D. Tenn. 1959) (citing Colegrove v.
Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946)); see Radford, 352 U.S. at 991; Kidd, 352 U.S. at 920; Anderson
v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912, 912 (1952); Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916, 916 (1952); South v.
Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950); MacDougall, 335 U.S. at 281; Colegrove, 330 U.S. at 804;
Turman, 329 U.S. at 675; Cook, 329 U.S. at 675.
29. Telephone interview by Anthony Lewis with Burke W. Mathes, Jr., quoted in
Anthony Lewis, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REv. 29, 30-31
(1997).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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the following term. The Court so ordered a week after this first
conference.
32
The Court heard the second argument on October 9, 1961.
Justice Frankfurter had been hard at work in the interim, drafting a
sixty-page memorandum that he circulated to his colleagues the day
after the reargument. Justice Brennan responded with a memo of his
own, drafted by Roy Schotland, his law clerk, which showed the
arbitrary disparities between districts.33 Neither salvo appears to have
had much influence, at least initially. During the October 13
postargument conference, Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, Clark, and
Whittaker (absent a fifth vote on the other side) were still in favor of
affirming the lower court decision. Similarly, Justices Black, Douglas,
Brennan, and the Chief Justice were in favor of reversal. In the end,
Justice Stewart sided with Brennan, making it 5-4 for reversal. The
Chief Justice then assigned the difficult task of writing the opinion to
Justice Brennan. On January 22, 1962, Justice Brennan sent the first
printed draft of the opinion to Justice Stewart. Justice Stewart was
satisfied with it, thus holding the small majority together.
During the same conference of October 13, Justice Clark still
sided with the Frankfurter camp. In essence, he argued that the
plaintiffs could "invoke the ample powers of Congress"-, for relief.
He also asserted the view that aggrieved groups had not made this
problem a campaign issue.35 In this way, Justice Clark was essentially
arguing that plaintiffs had yet to exhaust all avenues of relief. For the
Court to step in, all relevant avenues must be effectively foreclosed.
On February 2, Justice Clark wrote to Justice Brennan that he must
delay the case, for he was working on a separate opinion in addition
to Justice Frankfurter's dissent. During the course of writing this
opinion, however, a curious thing happened: Justice Clark changed
his mind. As Burke Mathes, his law clerk, explained:
In the process of writing his dissent he explored the
argument that other remedies were available. He just
concluded that there weren't any. I think he surprised
himself. He felt badly doing that to Justice Frankfurter,
32. Baker v. Carr, 366 U.S. 907,907 (1962).
33. Professor Schotland, now a professor of law at Georgetown University Law
Center, offers his views on Baker v. Carr in this symposium. See Roy A. Schotland, The
Limits of Being "Present at the Creation," 80 N.C. L. REV. 1505 (2002).
34. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,556 (1946).
35. PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS, supra note 14, at 848-49.
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whom he so often joined, at that late stage. But afterward
he felt good-felt he had done the right thing.36
In taking this view, Justice Clark came to understand the facts in
Baker as presenting a classic lockup scenario.37 That is to say, the
majority did not have any way to exert itself in Tennessee;38 it had no
36. Lewis, supra note 29.
37. The plaintiffs in Baker made much of this fact from the beginning of their
litigation; as they wrote in their jurisdictional statement, "[t]he utter lack of reme[d]y
makes the Appellants' cause unique." Jurisdictional Statement, in LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 14, at 24; see MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT:
NEW APPROACHES TO POLITICAL JURISPRUDENCE 233-36 (1964); Lewis, supra note 19;
Louis H. Pollak, Judicial Power and "The Politics of the People," 72 YALE L.J. 81, 88-89
(1962) (reading Baker as a lockup case because majorities had no way of changing the
existing redistricting plan in order to end the rural stranglehold on the legislature). This
was also true in Alabama at the time of the litigation that culminated in Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 570 n.47 (1964). See generally Ely, supra note 11 (discussing gerrymandering
concerns); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups
of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998) (suggesting that courts should
destabilize entrenched partisan forces and restore a more competitive political
environment).
38. See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of the State of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 742
(1964) (Clark, J., dissenting); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 258-59 (1962) (Clark, J.,
concurring). In response, it may be said that these cases are not lockup cases in a
normative sense, for under its Section 5 power, Congress could have ultimately intervened
and, for example, established the one-person, one-vote standard. During the first oral
argument, on April 19, 1961, Justice Stewart asked precisely that question: "If this is
really an equal protection denial, a denial of equal protection of the laws, I suppose the
Congress of the United States, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, could do
something about it, couldn't it?" Oral Argument, April 19, 1961, in LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 14, at 559. The state of Tennessee similarly contended that "[t]he Constitution
of Tennessee can be amended. Congress can enact remedial legislation. These are the
traditional processes of a democratic government. Is it better to employ these procedures
or is it better for this Court to legislate judicially?" Supplemental Brief for Appellants, in
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 14, at 268.
In a real sense, however, it is questionable at best whether Tennessee residents
had any options. I side with Justice Clark's conclusion. As he wrote in his concurring
opinion in Baker v. Carr.
Although I find the Tennessee apportionment statute offends the Equal
Protection Clause, I would not consider intervention by this Court into so
delicate a field if there were any other relief available to the people of
Tennessee. But the majority of the people of Tennessee have no "practical
opportunities for exerting their political weight at the polls" to correct the
existing "invidious discrimination." Tennessee has no initiative and referendum.
I have searched diligently for other "practical opportunities" present under the
law. I find none other than through the federal courts.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 258-59 (Clark, J., concurring); see Black, supra note 13, at 14; Lewis,
supra note 29, at 35; see also Comment, Challenges to Congressional Districting: After
Baker v. Carr Does Colegrove v. Green Endure?, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 98, 115 (1963)
(noting that state legislatures are unlikely to facilitate changes because "[i]nequality
among state legislative districts is far worse than among congressional districts,... the
rural interests now over-represented in Congress are even more heavily over-represented
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means to exact change in the face of a grossly malapportioned
legislature. Put simply, the majority was captive to the whims of an
entrenched legislature. Under such limited conditions, Baker makes
a great deal of sense.
Once Justice Clark changed his mind, all further pieces quickly
fell into place. With this vote, Justice Whittaker would side with the
Brennan camp and make it 6-3, maybe 7-2 if Justice Stewart stayed
on board. In the end, Justice Whittaker did not figure in the final
decision and Justice Stewart did stay on board, making it a 6-2
decision. As for the opinion itself, the Court remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. In so doing,
a crucial question immediately arose: what standards would serve to
guide the lower courts post-Baker? This question lies at the heart of
the next section.
B. The Standard: Rational Basis?
The preceding section sought to illustrate the institutional and
doctrinal complexities inherent to the reapportionment inactivity in
Tennessee and across the country. Most observers readily identified
the doctrinal difficulties as dating back to the Court's decision in
Colegrove v. Green. The institutional issues were similarly
predictable, as ultimately seen by the sharp divisions within the Court
and the number of opinions published. This led to much confusion,
particularly on the crucial question of judicial standards. What
exactly did the Court decide in Baker? Better yet, how will the Court
decide the next Baker, when the question is not one of inaction but
the clear pursuit of a (presumably rational) state policy?
This section looks for answers to these questions in three places.
First, it analyzes the lead opinion in Baker, authored by Justice
Brennan, and particularly its claim that judicial standards under the
Equal Protection Clause are "well developed and familiar." Second,
it turns to the pivotal concurring opinions of both Justice Clark and
Justice Stewart. When interpreting the Court's doctrinal stance, and
in light of their position as swing votes, these two Justices play a
particularly crucial role in unearthing how far the Court was willing to
go when interjecting itself into the redistricting process. Finally, this
section explores the Court's disposition of two lower court cases
decided soon after Baker-WMCA, Inc. v. Simon39 and Scholle v.
in the state legislatures. Thus the beneficiaries of malapportionment have been in a
position to prevent changes that would threaten their dominance.").
39. 370 U.S. 190 (1962).
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Hare.40 These short opinions offer an important glimpse into the
Court's doctrinal commitments and institutional duties. This section
concludes that rational basis review lay at the center of the Court's
newfound project in electoral politics.
1. Our "well-developed and familiar" Equal Protection Law
In Baker, Justice Brennan wrote for a majority of the Court that
"j]udicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well-
developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the
particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but
simply arbitrary and capricious action."'" For the laborious care with
which the Court sought to dispense with the imposing precedential
weight in its path, this "murky"'42 sentence was the only guidance
provided as to future cases. To the critics, the Court did not give
lower courts and redistricters in general enough guidance.43 This
section asks whether the Court did in fact provide a standard-the
trusted rational basis review. Subsequently, it explores what such a
standard would look like in the redistricting context.
On its face, the Court was clear about the source of its
displeasure.' The apportionment plan at issue in Baker reflected no
policy initiative by the Tennessee legislature but simple inaction. To
use the language of some members of the Court, the plan in question
did not represent the enactment of a state policy, but an arbitrary and
irrational quilt, the result of years of inactivity and inattention.45
Some commentators have characterized Tennessee's redistricting
dormancy up to the time of Baker as an "org[y] of inactivity, '46 or
40. 369 U.S. 429 (1962).
41. Baker, 369 U.S. at 226.
42. Lewis, supra note 29, at 33.
43. See sources cited supra note 13.
44. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 265 (Clark, J., concurring).
45.. See id at 265 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The complaint in this case asserts that
Tennessee's system of apportionment is utterly arbitrary-without any possible
justification in rationality."); id. at 254 (Clark, J., concurring) (contending that
"Tennessee's apportionment is a crazy quilt without rational basis").
46. Alexander M. Bickel, The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 39, 44
(1962); see Gerhard Casper, Apportionment and the Right to Vote: Standards of Judicial
Scrutiny, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 7 ("Baker v. Carr had concerned a relatively clear
situation: a state constitutional command to reapportion every ten years and no action by
the Tennessee legislature since 1901."); Dixon, supra note 7, at 224 ("Baker v. Carr can be
justified without jumping all the way to arithmetic absolutism.... [S]ome judicial
intervention in the politics of the people seemed necessary to have an effective political
system.... [Baker] would terminate egregious population disparities."); McCloskey, supra
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what Leroy Hardy has called a "silent gerrymander."'47 Tennessee
legislators in 1961 could not have given a plausible answer to the
question of exactly what policy their plan was designed to further. As
the lines stood, they could not be justified. During the second oral
argument, on October 19, the lawyer defending the plan was asked
exactly this question, and he agreed that "there was no reason for the
disparate treatment, and that maybe the Legislature could justify it,
but he could not."'  The mere fact that the legislature had failed to
redraw the state's district lines in accordance with the state
constitution points to the conclusion that no legitimate state policy
was being furthered, all in the name of political self-interest.49
Seen this way, a very strong argument could be made that Baker
was as far as the Court should have gone in the reapportionment
field. So long as policy-makers craft reapportionment plans with a
legitimate policy in mind, and the plan at issue may be reasonably
understood as a means to carry out that policy, the Court should
approve of the plan.50 This is traditional rational basis review, a very
flexible standard that allows redistricters much leeway when crafting
their redistricting plans. In this way, the Court should allow state
legislators to take the lead in redistricting, and intervene only when
extreme circumstances are present, as in Baker.51
note 13, at 73 (proposing that Baker should follow a restraintist path, adopting a rule "that
focused only on the opening up of the procedures of popular consent").
47. Leroy C. Hardy, Considering the Gerrymander, 4 PEPP. L. REv. 243,249 (1977).
48. Lewis, supra note 29, at 31; see Oral Argument, October 9, 1961 in LANDMARK
BRIEFS, supra note 14, at 674-75; see also Baker, 369 U.S. at 258 (Clark, J., concurring)
(stating that no one had come up with a rational justification for Tennessee's
apportionment statute). But see Bickel, supra note 46, at 43 ("Rationality-the presence
of some policy, the absence of 'simply arbitrary and capricious action'-sounds good, but
aside from temper tantrums, it chases its own tail. Most apportionments represent the
rational pursuit of a policy if the Court is willing to allow the policy to be pursued.").
49. Cf. Bickel, supra note 46, at 44 ("The Tennessee legislature, to be sure, could not
be accused of pursuing no intelligible end save only an unacknowledged and impermissible
one."). Seen this way, Baker is but a direct precursor to Davis v. Bandemer, 603 F. Supp.
1479 (S.D. Ind. 1984). See Alfange, supra note 13, at 188. In fact, while the rhetoric is
different, these cases are but mirror images of one another. Both cases worry about
representation and political losses, while setting a high standard for litigants to meet, in
deference of the complexities at issue in the reapportionment field.
50. But see Israel, supra note 13, at 109 (contending that the language about standards
is not enough because each subject matter has its own precise standard to help ascertain
whether the ground for discrimination is rational).
51. In the plaintiffs' words, judicial intervention was needed as a "necessary spur to
legislative action." Brief for Appellants, in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 14, at 129.
Professor Katzenbach notes,
The Supreme Court has not said that the courts are the only appropriate
instruments to reform electoral inequities. It has merely said that the legislatures
are no longer free to maintain such inequities. If they continue to do so, the
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This characterization hardly ends the inquiry, of course. For
example, and to press what may turn out to be the hardest question,
how should we determine the legitimacy of a professed state policy?
This question proves far more difficult than generally acknowledged.
For example, and in response to queries about the inaction on the
part of the Tennessee legislature, imagine the following interview
with a candid political leader within the state. The question is why
the legislature has not reapportioned for so long. The answer is well
known: it has not done so out of political self-interest. The
interviewee puts this point much more delicately than that; he speaks
of legitimate redistricting concerns, of the legislature's goal of
achieving "political or other ends of the State, its constituents, and its
officeholders."52 When pressed, the interviewee finally concedes the
obvious: the present inaction is simply a result of a legislative desire
to protect incumbents5 3 He then points out that the Supreme Court
has concluded that incumbency protection is a legitimate state
interest. 4 How should a court respond to this position?
I will respond to this position and related objections below. I will
also offer a much fuller defense for the view that rational basis review
should be the proper standard in redistricting. Before doing so, the
next section looks to Justices Clark's and Stewart's separate
concurrences in Baker. In order to understand what Baker could
accomplish in terms of doctrinal reach, the swing votes loom large.
courts can step in. The opinion should therefore be regarded by the legislatures
as an invitation to deal equitably with this problem, so long neglected.
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Some Reflections on Baker v. Carr, 15 VAND. L. REv. 829,
832-33 (1962); see also ROBERT B. McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND
POLITIcs OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 268-71 (1965) (arguing that the Court must leave
room for the states to experiment, as the equipopulation principle should not be a
straightjacket, but a minimum condition necessary to shake up states from undemocratic
circumstances). More recently, both the Court and commentators have heeded a similar
call. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146,156 (1993); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25,33-
34 (1993); Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights
Trilogy, 1993 SuP. CT. REv. 245.
52. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,754 (1973).
53. See Justice Harlan's dissent in Baker, where he contends that "the foremost
apparent legislative motivation has been to preserve the electoral strength of the rural
interests notwithstanding shifts in population." See Baker, 369 U.S. at 348 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
54. See, e.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 793-97 (1973); Bums v. Richardson, 384
U.S. 73, 89 n.16 (1966) ("The fact that district boundaries may have been drawn in a way
that minimizes the number of contests between present incumbents does not in and of
itself establish invidiousness.").
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2. Back to the Swing Votes
The initial distribution of Justices in Baker split evenly, with four
Justices standing on either side of the question 5 In the middle we
first found Justice Stewart, at whose insistence the Court scheduled a
reargument. A scant three weeks before the decision was ultimately
handed down, Justice Clark changed his mind and sided with the
Brennan camp. This section explores the reasons for the change as
well as Justice Stewart's ultimate position. Their expositions are key
to understanding the reach of the Baker opinion, for these two
Justices represent the narrowest ground on which the issue was
decided. In order to understand Baker, we must first understand
these two positions.
a. Justice Clark and the Crazy Quilt
For Justice Clark, rationality was the proper constitutional
standard in redistricting questions. 56 This was a standard, he made
clear at the onset, that the Tennessee Constitution easily met. To his
mind, the problem arose when looking to the actions of the
Tennessee legislature, as it had failed to follow the prescriptions of
the state constitution. Justice Clark's examination of the voting
strength of counties with similar populations as well as the contrast of
small and large counties "leaves but one conclusion, namely that
Tennessee's apportionment is a crazy quilt without rational basis. 5 7
Put simply, the plan in question made very little sense whatsoever.
Whether comparing districts similar in size or large districts with
smaller ones, one could not discern the pursuit of a rational state
policy.
From the tenor of his opinion as well as his position in Baker and
subsequent cases, this last fact is key. As he wrote,
The truth is that-although this case has been here for two
years and has had over six hours' argument (three times the
ordinary case) and has been most carefully considered over
and over again by us in Conference and individually-no
55. This division takes into account Justice Whittaker's decision to side with the
Frankfurter camp so long as the Brennan camp could only garner five votes. Due to the
magnitude of the intrusion into state prerogatives, he was unwilling to give the fifth vote to
overturn Colegrove on a 5-4 vote. See Lewis, supra note29, at 31.
56. Baker, 369 U.S. at 253 (Clark, J., concurring) (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical,
348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961), for the
proposition that a "statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it").
57. Baker, 369 U.S. at 254 (Clark, J., concurring).
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one, not even the State nor the dissenters, has come up with
any rational basis for Tennessee's apportionment statute
In making this claim, Justice Clark immediately denied the
centrality of mathematical equality to his position. He made clear the
point was not that districts must be equal in population. Rather, the
point was that, whatever a state decides to do, it must follow a
rational pattern. In this way, if some districts adhere to mathematical
equality while others do not, the state may explain the disparities.59
The state of Tennessee could not do so. In light of the facts at issue,
this conclusion should not be entirely surprising.
At this juncture, however, Justice Clark might still be unwilling
to open the federal forum for adjudication of redistricting questions.
Yet, he made clear again that the case of Tennessee was particularly
problematic. Put simply, "the majority of the people of Tennessee
have no '[p]ractical opportunities for exerting their political weight at
the polls' to correct the existing [malapportionment]." 6  This was
another way of saying, Justice Clark continued, that "the majority of
the voters have been caught up in a legislative strait jacket." His
reasons were many: the state did not allow for initiatives or
referenda, the legislature refused to reapportion, nor would the
Governor or the state courts, and the constitutional convention route
had proven "fruitless."61 The voters could still appeal to Congress
before turning to the federal courts, he recognized, and yet, "from a
practical standpoint this is without substance. To date Congress has
never undertaken such a task in any State."62 It was on these facts,
and these facts only, that he concluded that the federal courts must
intervene.
b. Justice Stewart and the Limits of the Court's Decision
In his separate concurrence, Justice Stewart took a similar view
of the case. He did not agree with the reach of the Court's holding in
Baker, to be sure, for he sought to limit it beyond what the Court's
words and the relevant rules of civil procedure might sensibly bear.
Yet, he still agreed with Justice Clark in a crucial sense, a sense that
makes a retelling of his position worth exploring.
58. Id at 258 (Clark, J., concurring); see id. (Clark, J., concurring) ("But certainly
there must be some rational design to a State's districting. The discrimination here does
not fit any pattern-as I have said, it is but a crazy quilt.").
59. Id. at 260 (Clark, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 258-59 (Clark, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 259 (Clark, J., concurring).
62. Id. (Clark, J., concurring).
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Justice Stewart began his short contribution by stressing his
belief about the Court's actual holding. This was needed due in large
part to the sharp divisions within the Court. To his mind, the Court
decided only three things: that it had subject matter jurisdiction, that
the plaintiffs had standing to sue, and that the cause of action was in
fact justiciable. 3 That was all. On this reading, the Court did not
intimate a view about the facts in question, nor did it provide lower
courts any standards for analyzing the issues soon to confront them.
This reading of the case comports with the conventional wisdom,
which portrays Baker as a minimalist opinion and the Court as too
willing to remand the case to the lower court without any semblance
of doctrinal guidance. 64 Leaving aside whether Justice Stewart was
right,65 however, do note what he implied. He read the record to
reflect no conclusion on the part of the District Court as to whether
the apportionment system in Tennessee was "utterly arbitrary-
without any possible justification in rationality. ' 66 He also did not
understand the Court in Baker to have reached a decision on this
question either. This was the position of the plaintiffs in Baker, yet,
to Justice Stewart, it remained a position yet to be proved by the
plaintiffs or refuted by the state.
Hence, this would be the task to which the lower courts must
turn. The standard was exactly this: were the redistricting plans in
question utterly arbitrary, the reflection of no policy on the part of
the state but arbitrary and capricious action?67 In this regard, the
Court did not demand population equality, nor did it conclude that
"there is anything in the Federal Constitution 'to prevent a State,
acting not irrationally, from choosing any electoral legislative
structure it thinks best suited to the interests, temper, and customs of
its people.' "I A state could very well choose its legislative structure,
so long as it did so rationally. It was clear from the record, Justice
Harlan's hypotheses to the contrary,69 that the State of Tennessee
may not be credited with having done so.
63. See id. at 265 (Stewart, J., concurring).
64. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 553, 587 (1964); Hasen, supra note 19, at 1502;
Schotland, supra note 33, at 1510.
65. See Israel, supra note 13.
66. Baker, 369 U.S. at 265 (Stewart, J., concurring).
67. See Friedelbaum, supra note 14, at 690-91 ("While the Court's treatment of the
issues remains technically within the 'correct' bounds outlined by Mr. Justice Stewart, the
equal protection clause plainly is made the adjudicatory standard by reference to which
the 'reasonableness' of apportionment plans are to be judged.").
68. Baker, 369 U.S. at 265 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 334 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
69. See id. at 340-49 app. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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3. The Court in Between: Scholle and Simon
This final section looks for further clues about the Court's
collective posture in Baker. It does so by looking to cases that
reached the high court soon after Baker. Two such cases merit
attention. These are Scholle v. Hare,70 initially decided under the
Michigan Constitution, and WMCA, Inc. v. Simon,71 from New York.
Both cases were remanded to the lower courts for decision in
consideration of Baker.
a. The Michigan Supreme Court, the State Senate, and the
Meaning of Baker
In Scholle, the Michigan Supreme Court confronted a challenge
to a 1952 amendment to the Michigan Constitution establishing
permanent state senate districts.72 Under this amendment, adopted
by- a margin of approximately 300,000 votes during the general
election, the state senate would retain a geographical bias, favoring
the rural interests. In contrast with the apportionment at issue in
Baker, however, the state house would be apportioned in accordance
with population. Also worthy of note is the fact that the state
legislature had twice reapportioned the seats in the lower house
between 1925 and the beginning of the lawsuit in Scholle. To the
plaintiffs, this all mattered little. They attacked the 1952 amendment
as an arbitrary and unreasonable distribution of senate seats in
violation of both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Federal Constitution.7 3
In a 5-3 decision, the Michigan Supreme Court denied the
plaintiffs relief. Four members of the court concluded that the facts
did not rise to a constitutional violation. In contrast, three members
of the court thought that the apportionment scheme enacted under
the 1952 amendment completely lacked rationality. The court's final
member, Justice Eugene Black, thought that the plan in fact violated
the Equal Protection Clause, yet understood the reapportionment
cases to bar the state supreme court from correcting the violation.
The U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Scholle a month
after Baker. It did not decide much, but instead vacated the state
court's judgment and remanded the case to the lower court "for
further consideration in the light of Baker v. Carr."74 Justices Clark
70. 369 U.S. 429 (1962).
71. 370 U.S. 190 (1962).
72. Scholle v. Hare, 104 N.W.2d 63,63 (Mich. 1960), vacated by 369 U.S. 429 (1962).
73. Id.
74. Scholle, 369 U.S. at 429.
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and Stewart issued a concurring opinion in response to Justice
Harlan's dissent. In light of the lower court's handling of the issues as
well as its reading of the proper doctrinal test, the remand in Scholle
raises three issues worth exploring.
First, the Scholle case stands in direct contrast with Baker in
many respects For one, the issues in Scholle relate only to the state
senate, not the entire legislative body. Further, the apportionment
scheme under attack was enacted by the citizens of the state a decade
before, not fifty or sixty years prior. And finally, the apportionment
in question was stipulated by the state constitution, not in violation of
it.
Second, consider Justice Stewart's claim in Baker about the reach
of the Court's opinion. On its face, one may agree with Justice
Stewart that the Court decided very little in Baker. And yet, as I
argued in the previous section, one may also agree that his
concurrence in the case may be read as accepting, if implicitly, the
view that Baker brought the Equal Protection Clause to bear on the
state practices under attack. If this is true, how should one interpret
the view, expressed by Justices Stewart and Clark in their joint
concurring opinion in Scholle, that a majority of the state court had
deemed the merits of the claim unenforceable in court?76 To be sure,
a careful analysis of the lower court's opinion makes this statement
disingenuous at best.77 This new concurrence, however, reinforces my
earlier point. The only reason to remand in Scholle, even under the
assumption that Baker decided exactly what Justice Stewart claimed it
did, would be to force the lower courts to apply traditional equal
protection principles to the facts at issue. Otherwise, the remand, and
Justice Stewart's position in general, make very little sense.
Third, if the Court in fact established rationality as the proper
constitutional parameter, why remand here? Recall that four Justices
of the Michigan Supreme Court had concluded that the
apportionment scheme did not violate the Equal Protection Clause,
while three had concluded that the scheme was in fact irrational. The
eighth Justice had found a violation yet disagreed with the state court
on the question of jurisdiction. Thus, the issue could not be that the
lower court had failed to appreciate the Supreme Court's earlier
pronouncement in Baker, because the Michigan court asked precisely
whether the apportionment scheme was "wholly arbitrary," and four
75. See id. at 433 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76. See UL at 430 (Clark, J., and Stewart, J., concurring).
77. See Lucas, supra note 14, at 759.
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of its members concluded that it was not." What then was the U.S.
Supreme Court's motivation?
At this juncture, I offer a tentative and largely conjectural
answer. Based on the facts at issue as well as the posture of the case
on appeal, it appears as if the Court in Scholle remanded in order to
bide its time for a future change of course.79 Justice Harlan offered a
similar hypothesis, when he wrote that the Michigan court would
have to choose between upholding its prior decision or
treating the remand as an oblique invitation from this Court
to hold that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a State
from constitutionally freezing the seats in its Senate, with
the effect of maintaining numerical voting inequalities, even
though that course reflects the expressed will of the people
of the State."8
Of note, the state supreme court on remand declared the 1952
amendment unconstitutional.81
b. The New York Constitution and Rural Bias
The provisions of the New York Constitution at issue in WMCA
v. Simon differed somewhat from those in Tennessee and Michigan.
The New York Constitution, unlike the Tennessee Constitution,
demanded the reflection of rural bias in apportionment plans. In
contrast with the Michigan Constitution, which directly defined what
the state senate districts would be, the New York Constitution
established a formula for the General Assembly to follow. Under this
formula, the ratios between urban and rural counties were similar to
those seen in Baker. As a result, this case was not one of inaction, as
in Baker; rather, the question in Simon was whether the state may
pursue the policy of rural bias as codified in the state constitution.
A three-judge court held, in a 2-1 decision, that the New York
plan was not irrational.82 The third judge did not reach the merits but
78. 104 N.W.2d at 83 (finding the 1962 amendments "palpably arbitrary").
79. Professor Shapiro speaks to this position in general form. As he writes,
[t]he first and greatest battle rages around the relatively narrow and therefore
most easily defended opinion. Then, when the shouting has died down somewhat
and the position is solidified by widespread public acceptance, the Court goes on
to what it really intended all along, the broadest and most extreme application of
its initial decision. Such tactics are politically clever, but they may be too clever.
SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 252.
80. Scholle, 369 U.S. at 434-35 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
81. See Scholle v. Hare, 116 N.W.2d 350,355-56 (Mich. 1962), vacated by 369 U.S. 429
(1962).
82. WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 202 F. Supp. 741,751-752 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), vacated by, 370
U.S. 190 (1962).
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concluded instead that the matter was not justiciable.83 A scant six
weeks after issuing its decision in Scholle, the U.S. Supreme Court
remanded for consideration in light of its decision in Baker. Before
giving way to the expected dissent from Justice Harlan, the Court
added a sentence worth examining: "As in Scholle v. Hare, we believe
that the court below should be the first to consider the merits of the
federal constitutional claim, free from any doubts as to its
justiciability and as to the merits of alleged arbitrary and invidious
geographical discrimination."'  In taking this view, the Court makes
explicit the view I have defended in this Article. The merits of a
claim of constitutional violation, to the Court majority, is whether the
state engages in "arbitrary and invidious geographical
discrimination." I do not pretend that this is an easy question, nor do
I argue that the Court even attempted to explain what this might
mean.8 5 I do stand by my earlier position that the Supreme Court
wished for lower courts to decide these questions on their own. In
taking this view, I suspect that some readers will immediately
disagree with this position. The next Part responds to these concerns.
II. A PRELIMINARY DEFENSE OF RATIONALITY REVIEW IN
REDISTRICTING
This Article has argued that the U.S. Supreme Court in Baker v.
Carr directed lower courts to apply equal protection principles to the
redistricting plans in question.86 This Part places that position on
more abstract ground. It does so in two ways. The first section offers
an initial and concededly partial defense for the use of rationality in
redistricting. In order to reinforce this first section, the second
section looks elsewhere, to the Court's use of the arbitrary and
capricious standard in the administrative law context. This Part
concludes that rationality review may have an important role to play
in the redistricting contextY
83. Id. at 755 (Waterman, J., concurring).
84. WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 370 U.S. 190, 191 (1962).
85. See id. at 194 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Lucas, supra note 14, at 763.
86. See, e.g., Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 180 A.2d 656, 668
(Md. 1962) ("[T]here is a strong implication in the Baker decision that there must be some
reasonable relationship of population, or eligible voters, to representation in the General
Assembly, if an apportionment is to escape the label of constitutionally-prohibited
invidious discrimination.").
87. In making this claim, I must underscore that this position deserves a much more
exhaustive treatment than you will find here. A future project will attempt to address this
shortcoming.
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A. Rationality in Redistricting
This section begins with the premise that redistricting is
"primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its
legislature or other body, rather than of a federal court."8 Two
particular questions ground the discussion. First, why use rationality
review as the appropriate standard as opposed to the more aggressive
equipopulation standard or the toothless political questions doctrine?
In answering this question as I do, the second question immediately
arises: what kinds of justifications may be qualified as legitimate?
For example, is incumbency protection a legitimate state interest?
1. A General Theory
a. Reasonableness and Burden-Shifting
In answering the first question, this section keeps in mind two
overarching concerns. First, it takes to heart criticisms of the Court's
unaccountable status and the countermajoritarian criticism that has
pervaded the constitutional law field for the last generation.89
Second, it recognizes that these concerns are magnified in the
reapportionment field, an area that stands at the core of our nation's
democratic promise. Reapportionment and redistricting are the
lifeblood of our political system, the initial mechanisms through
which our representative system takes shape. But that is not all. As
the Court intervenes in this ultra-political arena,90 it is inherently
affecting political decisions at their core, taking sides in a process
where neutral outcomes are impossibilities. 91 The utmost judicial care
88. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25,34 (1993); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975);
see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 978 (1996) (recognizing the Court's "longstanding
recognition of the importance in our federal system of each State's sovereign interest in
implementing its redistricting plan"). But see Bush, 517 at 1038 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court's doctrinal shift since Shaw, which "guaranteed that federal courts
will have a hand-and perhaps the only hand-in the 'abrasive task of drawing district
lines' ") (citing Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 554 (1969) (White, J., dissenting)).
89. The classic citation here is ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 57 (1962); see Steve Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and
the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 passim (1995); Suzanna Sherry, Too Clever by
Half- The Problem With Novelty in Constitutional Law, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 921, 921 (2001)
("One might say that reconciling judicial review and democratic institutions is the goal of
almost every major constitutional scholar writing today.").
90. See Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative
Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541,541-42 (1994).
91. Gordon E. Baker, Threading the Political Thicket by Tracing the Steps of the Late
Robert G. Dixon, Jr.: An Appraisal and an Appreciation, in REPRESENTATION AND
REDISTRICTING ISSUES 21, 32 (Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 1982) (quoting Statement of
Robert G. Dixon, Jr. at Hearings on S. 596 before the U.S. Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs) ("[T]here are no 'neutral' lines for legislative districts.
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cannot avoid this reality. These two concerns lead me away from an
activist judicial model and toward a view of the Court as both
cognizant and respectful of democratic politics.92
An expected response to the adoption of such a relaxed standard
posits that voting is different from other doctrinal areas.93 I agree
with that characterization. However, this difference leads me away
from an activist mode of judicial review and toward the more flexible
rational basis approach. Redistricting is but a re-enactment of past
political battles and a preview of future ones.94 At best, one may say
that particular redistricting outcomes set the ground rules for all
subsequent political battles. And yet, even in this light, redistricting
battles must be seen as inseparable from substantive policy-making.95
Whether... drawn by a ninth-grade civics class, a board of Ph.D.'s, or a computer, every
line drawn aligns partisans and interest blocks in a particular way different from the
alignment resulting from putting the line in some other place."); see BRUCE A. CAIN, THE
REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 183 (1984) (accord); Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the
Right to Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869, 909 (1995) ("[]n districted representation systems, the
state is the market and the vagaries of territorial boundaries yield no 'neutral'
distributional mechanism that can serve as the point of departure.").
92. For a sustained critique of Shaw and the Court's approach to redistricting
questions in general, see Erin Daly, Idealis4 Pragmatists, and Textualists: Judging
Electoral Districts in America, Canada, and Australia, 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 261
passim (1998).
93. See Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is Different, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 1201 passim (1996); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, Ethnic Segregation by
Religion and Race: Reflections on Kiryas Joel and Shaw v. Reno, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 515,
524 n.26 (1995-96) ("A legislative district functions differently from a town, a school
district, or a municipal facility. The district does not govern itself.... Instead, it is a means
by which interests are voiced and counted. It makes sense only as part of a political
process that includes other, differently composed districts."); Samuel Issacharoff,
Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights
Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1836-37 (1992) (explaining that the realities of
racial bloc voting and the rise of a "racially defined majority faction" make the voting
rights arena different from other areas of constitutional law).
94. See Karlan, supra note 51, at 256 (explaining how lawsuits and legal standards,
particularly one person, one vote, are used in redistricting as "vehicle[s] for short-
circuiting the states' routine redistricting procedures"); Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra
note 19, at 4 (noting that redistricting is purely political); Thomas B. Edsall, Parties Play
Voting Rights Role Reversal, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2001, at A4 ("Strategists in both
parties are preparing to take every adverse political redistricting outcome to court."); see
also Lucas, supra note 14, at 801-02 ("The most disturbing feature of the apportionment
cases is the fact that beneath the surface of [each case], and not very far beneath at that,
lies a partisan political struggle.... The contest is not between people living in one area or
another; it is between Democrats and Republicans.").
95. To be clear, the point here is quite simple: redistricting battles are first and
foremost battles over subsequent control of the legislative process. This fact accounts for
the vehemence and vigor with which partisans approach the redistricting season. Taken to
its logical extreme, the larger point is that the political parties will turn to the courts in
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After all, those who seek control of the redistricting process do so in
order to gain subsequent control of the legislative process.
Legislative control is then expected to lead to the passage of
amenable legislation. It is partly for this reason that this Article
contends that rational basis review should be the applicable standard
for redistricting cases.
This position raises two immediate questions. First, which is the
appropriate kind of rationality review in this context? And second,
what is the significance of the fact that redistricting involves the
weighing of the right to vote, which is in itself a fundamental right?96
In looking to the facts and interests at issue, I concede at the
onset my initial attraction to the application of lenient rationality in
redistricting. This is the view epitomized by the Court's decision in
Williamson v. Lee Optical.97 I ultimately reject this position, for the
Court's posture in like cases would move the Court too close to the
political questions regime, which asserts that the Court has little to
offer when confronted with redistricting questions. To the contrary,
the Court has much to offer, particularly when confronted with facts
such as those presented in the Baker and Reynolds cases when state
legislatures refuse to reapportion themselves for decades.
This is not to say, to turn to the second question, that the Court
should examine redistricting plans aggressively. Were the Court to
subject redistricting compromises to aggressive review, it would
essentially take the task away from state legislatures, while thrusting
them onto the federal court system. This is too much. This Article
looks for a middle ground between these two positions, between the
use of aggressive scrutiny and rationality review.
For an answer, albeit a preliminary one, this Article looks to a
hardened version of rationality review, what Gerald Gunther labeled
a generation ago as "rationality with bite."98 That is, this Article
argues that the Court's job should be limited to examining the
order to overturn clearly political outcomes. This development should give us reason for
pause and reflection.
96. This question is similar to the position taken by Justice Marshall in Bolden, where
he argued that the Court should focus on the "fundamental rights" aspect of this problem,
because it involves the right to vote. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 113-24 (1980)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
98. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 22 (1972).
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legitimacy of the state's proffered interest.9 9 Under this argument, a
reviewing court must exhibit a deferential posture, keeping in mind at
all times that redistricting is a matter left for each state to carry out.
In the face of gross population disparities,"° the burden would then
shift to the state to provide a rational explanation for the
disparities.1 As for the explanations themselves, political actors
need only to express the enactment of a legitimate legislative policy,
and the means in question must seek to sensibly carry out such
ends.1°2 This is the kind of judicial approach that leaves ample wiggle
room for legislative actors to carry out their political preferences.
This strand, concededly, would leave little for the Court to do. °3 I
take this to be not a limitation on this model but a virtue.
99. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966); Lassiter v.
Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959). On this view, and in
particular the claim that the Court's jurisprudence is concerned with the notion of
"exclusionary reasons," see Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of
Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711,712 (1994).
100. One need not overextend this point. For my purposes, the Court's approach in
the context of state legislative districts provides a pertinent referent. There, the Court
settled on ten percent as the cutoff point for state redistricting plans. Deviations under ten
percent were presumptively constitutional, while any deviation over that threshold
required that the state in question provide a valid justification for its redistricting plan.
See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418 (1977) ("The maximum population deviations of
16.5% in the Senate districts and 19.3% in the House districts can hardly be characterized
as de minimis; they substantially exceed the 'under-10%' deviations the Court has
previously considered to be of prima facie constitutional validity only in the context of
legislatively enacted apportionments."); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973)
("[M]inor deviations from mathematical equality among state legislative districts are
insufficient to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justification by the State.").
101. Of note, this was exactly the approach proposed by Solicitor General Cox during
the Baker litigation. See LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 14, at 347 ("If gross disparities
and no alternative remedy available, burden should shift to the state to provide a rational
explanation. If a reasonable justification exists, the disparity should not be
unconstitutional.").
102. This language is analogous to Justice Stevens' own position. See Cousins v. City
Council, 466 F.2d 830, 859 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Turner v.
Fouche, 396 U.S. 346,362 (1970)) (demanding "a showing that the legislative classification
'rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a valid state objective' ").
103. See id. at 859 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Casper, supra note 46, at 7. I take this view,
to be clear, on the strength of the competing values at issue, not on any notion of
institutional incompetence. I harbor little doubt, based on their historic self-assurance and
willingness to carry out their perceived constitutional duties, that the Justices feel
comfortable, perhaps too much so, with districting questions. As Martin Shapiro
complains:
[I]t is insufficient to tell the Supreme Court that it ought not to intervene in a
certain area because it cannot construct an objective, general standard of the right,
the fair, and the just in that area. The Court often has been willing to act on the
basis of identifying the wrong, the unfair, and the unjust, and it surely can identify
those qualities in many districting maps.
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In response to this view, critics may immediately suggest that
"reasonableness" will not prove easy to discern in practice. This was
Alexander Bickel's point in response to the Court's opinion in Baker.
According to Bickel, the relevant passage from Baker "was at best a
shot in the dark, an arrow wafted skyward in the hope that some
appropriate target might find it, and, at worst, an evasion of the
problem."'' Professor Bickel's position is now a familiar one. In his
view, the reapportionment area presents difficult issues. For support,
he quotes approvingly from Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Baker:
Apportionment, by its character, is a subject of
extraordinary complexity, involving-even after the
fundamental theoretical issues concerning what is to be
represented in a representative legislature have been fought
out or compromised-considerations of geography,
demography, electoral convenience, economic and social
cohesions or divergencies among particular local groups,
communications, the practical effects of political institutions
like the lobby and the city machine, ancient traditions and
ties of settled usage, respect for proven incumbents of long
experience and senior status, mathematical mechanics,
censuses compiling relevant data, and a host of others.10 5
In light of so many factors at play in the redistricting context, how
may one discern from the available evidence whether a legislature
behaved rationally? To put this point differently, how can we
determine what a legislature intended?
In general, I agree with Professor Bickel; under most
circumstances, the Court should stay its hand and let redistricters do
as they will. In my estimation, and taking Bickel's and Justice
Frankfurter's account to heart, most redistricting plans will pass
constitutional review, and properly so. This is exactly what the
traditional rational basis standard is designed to accomplish, and I see
very little reason to change that approach in the redistricting area. It
is in this vein that I argue that Baker was unquestionably a special
Martin Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L. REV.
227, 249 (1985); see also Louis H. Pollak, Judicial Power and "The Politics of the People,"
72 YALE LJ. 81, 87 (1962) (contending that judges are competent to evaluate the
reasonableness of redistricting choices). The point is not that the Court cannot do it, for it
is clear that it can; the point instead is that it should not.
104. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and Reapportionment, in
REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970s, at 57, 62 (Nelson W. Polsby ed., 1971); see Casper,
supra note 46, at 29-32 (arguing that the Court has yet to distinguish the arbitrary from
the rational).
105. BICKEL, supra note 89, at 62 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 324 (1962)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)).
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case, a situation few other fact scenarios will be able to match. 6 As
long as a contemporaneous justification is given, most plans will be
legitimate exercises of state power. In Baker, justifications were
wanting, for the issue was one not of redistricting but inactivity.107 Put
simply, Tennessee did not have a justification; it had instead a claim
to institutional competence and judicial deference. As the Court
explained in Baker and subsequent cases, that was not enough under
the Equal Protection Clause. The least a state must do is proffer a
legitimate justification for its existing plan. This is a very modest
demand.
b. Of Rules Versus Standards and the Question of
Manageability
The position defended in this Article implicates longstanding
debates in the academy. In particular, the argument for a loose and
flexible "arbitrary and capricious" standard in redistricting fits
comfortably within the larger debate over the implementation of
rules versus standards. Much has been written on this subject, to be
sure. 08 For my purposes, the debate may be reduced to the following
propositions. On the one hand, advocates for the implementation of
rules exalt their manageability, their curtailment of discretion on the
part of the relevant decision maker, and the clear guidance they
provide to those who must rely on the rule in the future, to name a
few classic defenses. Conversely, those who advocate for the
development of standards commend the very flexibility that rules-
advocates wish to avoid. In particular, standards-advocates are
106. See Bickel, supra note 46, at 43 (analogizing the facts in Baker to those in
Colegrove, in the sense that, as in Tuskegee, "it is a species of temper tantrum also, though
in a somewhat different sense, to leave unchanged an ancient and obsolete
apportionment"); cf. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 565 (1946) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring) ("Assuming that the controversy is justiciable, I think the cause is of so
delicate a character, in view of the considerations above noted, that the jurisdiction should
be exercised only in the most compelling circumstances.").
107. See Bickel, supra note 46, at 44 (reading Baker for the proposition that "the
situation in Tennessee... is the result not of a deliberate if imperfect present judgment of
the political institutions, but merely of inertia and the abdication of political
responsibility"). Interestingly, the facts in Baker mirror those of its direct and infamous
precursor, Colegrove v. Green. See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 566-68 (Black, J., dissenting).
108. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Spencer
Overton, Rules, Standards, and Bush v. Gore: Form and the Law of Democracy, 37
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 65 (2002); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law,
69 B.U. L. REV. 781 (1989); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379
(1985); Kathleen Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22
(1992).
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attracted to the way in which standards make room for the
application of flexible directives across different, context-specific
situations.
This section addresses two of the central components of the
debate as it applies to legislative redistricting. In so doing, I must
underscore a point all too obvious: this Article sides with the
"standards" crowd. 109 The first argument goes to the heart of the
larger debate. In a nutshell, the claim from proponents of a rule-like
approach is that Reynolds brought on much-needed clarity and
stability to the implicit chaos begun by Baker."0 I respond to this
position in two ways. First, I do not read Reynolds to impose a strict
population mandate for future redistricting plans. The Court could
not have been any clearer on this point. As it wrote,
Somewhat more flexibility may therefore be constitutionally
permissible with respect to state legislative apportionment
than in congressional districting.... For the present, we
deem it expedient not to attempt to spell out any precise
constitutional tests. What is marginally permissible in one
State may be unsatisfactory in another, depending on the
particular circumstances of the case."'
This is hardly the language of a Court bent on the mechanical
application of strict rules. Rather, the Court simply made explicit
what had been implicit from the beginning: population matters, a lot.
Second, Reynolds as written got the problem exactly right. The
problem as framed by the courts themselves is as follows: we wish for
the states to carry out their legislative duties as they deem proper.11 2
As part of this process, we acknowledge the vast differences and the
divergent needs between one state and the next, between Colorado
with its geographic idiosyncrasies, Michigan with its upper peninsula,
and New York and Illinois with their heavy concentration of residents
in their urban centers. This is not to say that these states have free
reign in devising any redistricting plan of their choice; we also wish
for population to play a leading role in redistricting, as Reynolds
made clear. These two commitments point me away from a strict rule
of population equality and toward a much more flexible standard.
109. For a general defense of this position, see Heather K. Gerken, Morgan Kousser's
Noble Dream, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1298, 1302 (2001) (reviewing Morgan J. Kousser,
COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCTION (1999)).
110. Ely, supra note 11, at 121.
111. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,578 (1964).
112. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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Once we remind ourselves that questions of representation are both
difficult and somewhat intractable,"' doctrinal flexibility clearly
makes a lot of sense as applied to the redistricting context.14
This response leads directly to the second argument, which is far
more interested in the question of institutional competence. In a
nutshell, who should be charged with the responsibility of expressing
our particularized democratic affections in the form of legislative
districts?1 5 The answer is quite easy, as I pointed out earlier: we
have delegated this responsibility to the states, through either their
legislatures or some other state institution. If and when we agree
with this answer, then the rest is quite easy; standards must be
preferred over strict rules. Taken further, the Court's position in
Baker may be understood exactly on these terms. Alternatively, one
may read the use of rationality in Baker as imposing a structural rule
whereby courts will defer to the political process absent extenuating
circumstances."6 On either account, the courts' role is deferential to
politics and local circumstances. This is not to say, to be clear, that
the courts should not play a role at all; it is here where I part company
with Justice Frankfurter's tour de force in Baker. Instead, it is to say
that the courts' role should be limited to those moments when the
political process malfunctions, when malapportionments reach the
levels seen in Tennessee in the early 1960s or when political
majorities are locked out of power permanently." 7
It should not be surprising that both arguments in favor of
standards over rules are clearly reflected in recent cases. In
particular, I will comment briefly on the recent Bush v. Gore"8 as well
the racial redistricting cases as epitomized by Shaw v. Reno and its
113. This argument hardly requires any support, but for any skeptic out there, see
HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION passim (1966).
114. In framing my position this way, I find myself in partial agreement with Rick
Hasen in his contribution to this Symposium. I share his view about the value of
unmanageable standards. However, our aims diverge in some crucial respects, for, as he
points out, his focus is "on what the Court does to bind its own hand in future cases."
Hasen, supra note 19, at 1472 n.8. Conversely, my focus is far more structural in kind; that
is, I am interested in the prior question of allocation of responsibility.
115. As Spencer Overton writes, "[t]he choice between rules and standards is a kind of
structural determination about who will make decisions." Overton, supra note 108, at 98.
116. I thank Alan Brownstein for bringing this point to my attention. See Robert C.
Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Discrimination Legislation After
Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 463-64 (2000); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in
Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 410,
410 (1993).
117. See generally Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 37 (arguing that courts should
intervene when partisan forces have manipulated the "background rules").
118. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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progeny. 9 I take up the racial redistricting cases first, for they
provide by far the easiest challenge. Beginning with Shaw, the Court
made clear that it was shifting responsibility for monitoring legislative
redistricting involving race away from state legislatures and onto
itself, even in the face of clear racialist demands made by the Voting
Rights Act. I have argued elsewhere that the Court's approach in this
area was misguided. 20 To begin, the creation of majority-minority
districts implicates political problems of the highest order. Further,
the presence in this area of the Voting Rights Act lessens the need for
judicial supervision of the political process on behalf of discrete and
insular minorities. Taken together, these two views counsel against
the formalistic application of rigid rules, such as strict scrutiny, which
essentially aim to remove the use of race from politics altogether.
This is especially true here, as the use of race may be attributed to a
prior decision made by Congress under the amended section 2 of the
Act. To be sure, the Court could always make clear what its use of
strict scrutiny has made implicit: it could rule against the
constitutionality of the Act.'2' Or, it could apply a vague standard,
such as the "predominant factor" test, and shift power back to the
states. From its last performance in this area, the Court appears
committed to the latter approach, and thankfully so.'2
Bush v. Gore raises more difficult questions. In Bush, the
Supreme Court concluded that the use of the clear intent standard in
the manual recount during the Florida controversy violated the Equal
Protection Clause. More specifically for my purposes, the Court
concluded that such a standard would result in the arbitrary and
disparate treatment of voters across various jurisdictions in Florida.
As the Court wrote, recount procedures in Florida did "not satisfy the
minimum requirement for nonarbitrary treatment of voters necessary
to secure the fundamental right" of voting.'" This was so, the Court
explained, because counties across Florida would interpret the legal
directive differently, thus failing to afford all ballots within the state
119. 509 U.S. 630 (1993); see, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Bush v.
Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
120. See Guy-Uriel Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges to Racial Redistricting
in the New Millenium: Hunt v. Cromartie as a Case Study, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 227
passim (2001).
121. In light of the Court's decision in City of Boerne, the issue has gained much
saliency. See Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights
and Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 725 (1998).
122. See Easley, 532 U.S. at 257; Charles & Fuentes, supra note 120.
123. Bush, 531 U.S. at 105.
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equal treatment. As a result, what may count as a legal ballot in one
jurisdiction may be discarded in another.
In taking this view, the Court was clearly shifting responsibility
away from the political branches and onto itself. After all,
mechanisms were in place to decide the very question that arose in
the Florida controversy. 4 As such, I take the same position here that
I take generally in matters of legislative redistricting. Absent exigent
circumstances, the Court must play a lessened role. Specifically to the
Bush v. Gore controversy, I share with others the view that the Court
should have allowed the political process to run its course.25 In this
way, I agree with Rick Hasen when he writes that "Reynolds v. Sims,
whether it is good or bad politics, begets Bush v. Gore.1' 26 More
crucially, he offers a sentiment that stands at the core of this Article:
"If the Supreme Court will intervene periodically in the political
process, it behooves us to continue the debate over when it is
appropriate for courts to intervene in the political process."' 2 7 I
agree. This Article sides with those who wish for the political process
to do more, and for the Court to do less, much less.
2. A Question of Interests and the Protection of Incumbents
A test of reasonableness makes very modest demands. As
Justice Stevens admonished long ago, "the burden which plaintiffs
must overcome is a severe one, comparable.., to a showing that the
legislative classification 'rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of a valid state objective.' "28 The judicial inquiry thus
hinges, as with traditional rational basis review, on the state's
professed redistricting objective. Not surprisingly, most plans will
meet constitutional prescriptions under this test.
Thus posited, the argument begs difficult questions about the
legitimacy of some of the redistricting choices currently available to
those in control of redistricting processes. Seen as a whole, the
124. See Electoral Count Act, 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
125. See Elizabeth Garrett, Leaving the Decision to Congress, in THE VOTE: BUSH,
GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 38 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds.,
2001); Pamela S. Karlan, The Court Casts its Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2000, at A31.
126. Richard L. Hasen, A "Tincture of Justice": Judge Posner's Failed Rehabilitation of
Bush v. Gore, 80 TEx. L. REV. 137, 154 (2001) (reviewing Richard A. Posner, BREAKING
THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001)).
127. Id.
128. Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830, 859 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362 (1970)); see Rex E. Lee, Mr. Herbert Spencer
and the Bachelor Stockbroker. Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 15 ARIZ. L.
REV. 457, 457-58 (1973).
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available choices are many. A state may decide, for example, to craft
its new districts in terms of population, geography, or political
boundaries. 12 9 These should all be rational, legitimate choices. A
much more difficult question arises when considering the role played
by incumbency protection in redistricting. To date, the commentary
has been mostly negative.130  The Supreme Court, in contrast, has
made clear that incumbency protection is a legitimate state interest. 3'
This section offers a partial defense of the Court's position. Three
arguments prove particularly convincing.
First, in light of the admitted impossibility of drawing neutral
district lines, and short of imposing a proportional representation
system, what on earth should an incumbent in charge of the
redistricting process do? 132 To be sure, perhaps incumbents should
design whatever districts comport with general notions of fair
representation and the like. Similarly, it is perhaps a good idea to
delegate the redistricting duties to special masters, nonpartisan
boards, or maybe even to choose our representatives by a process of
lottery selection.33 In this vein, those who criticize the present system
and particularly the legislative choices made therein are wishing,
sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly, for a revival of the
republican ideal. I, too, wish for similar things. Under our present
system, however, the calls for change often stop short of calling for a
retooling of the redistricting process and instead advocate doctrinal
129. See, e.g., Bush v. Martin, 224 F. Supp. 499, 511 (S.D. Tex. 1963) ("[U]nless the
State constitutional or legislative standards impose numerical equality as the predominate
test and.., such local standards [are elevated] to a federally guaranteed right, a number of
other elements may well be open besides population. These perhaps include geography,
area, economic, social, topographical, sociological or political factors.").
130. See, e.g., Sally Dworak-Fisher, Note, Drawing the Line on Incumbency Protection,
2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 131 (1996); Kristen Silverberg, Note, The Illegitimacy of Incumbent
Gerrymander, 74 TEX. L. REV. 913 (1996).
131. See, e.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 793-97 (1973) (including incumbency
protection as a legitimate districting principle); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751-
54, 752 n.18 (1973) (concluding that a state may allocate seats proportionately to major
political parties); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n.16 (1966) ("The fact that district
boundaries may have been drawn in a way that minimizes the number of contests between
present incumbents does not in and of itself establish invidiousness.").
132. Robert B. McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 MICH.
L. REV. 223, 235 (1968) ("The habit of legislative redistricting for partisan advantage is so
deeply ingrained in the American legislative and political structure that it will be rooted
out only with difficulty.").
133. See, e.g., MCKAY, supra note 51, at 269-71; Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Fair Criteria and
Procedures for Establishing Legislative Districts, in REPRESENTATION AND
REDISTRICTING ISSUES, supra note 91, at 7, 10-11; Ely, supra note 11, at 638-39; Samuel
Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness,
71 TEX. L. REV. 1643,1691-95 (1993); McKay, supra note 132, at 235.
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fine-tuning. In so doing, these criticisms implicitly place the Court at
the center of the redistricting process. I reject precisely this move.
Until we remove the redistricting process from the legislative arena,
we should let the politicians do their work.
Second, redistricting plans are plainly unfair to the legislators on
the losing side. That is to say, control of the redistricting process by
an opposing party can make life very difficult for an incumbent. To
name two leading examples, a redistricting plan could place
incumbents from the same party in the same district; it could also
place an incumbent in a new district with a majority population from
the opposing party.134 I concede that this is not a fair way to draw
district lines. As far as the represented are concerned, however, it is
far from clear whether it makes a difference who runs within the
particular district.
Two reasons lead me to this view. First, elections may be
understood as a way to provide representation for those at the district
level. On this account, electors have a myriad of choices in the
primary contests and a more focused choice during the general
election. In both instances, electors make choices based on the
candidates presented to them. While the candidates themselves may
have a gripe about the system, and a valid one at that, it is harder for
the electors themselves to raise complaints of constitutional
significance. Put another way, partisan control of the redistricting
process will likely lead to an attempt to maximize this advantage.
Yet, as far as representation theories are concerned, the identity of the
winning candidate matters little to the electoral majority within the
district.135 This is particularly true during the general election, when
partisans have already selected their candidate of choice. 36 Second,
elections must also be understood at the meta-level, where
aggregation of votes at the state or national level assumes much
134. See DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING:
COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 103 (1992); David S. Broder, Politics
Without the Voting, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2001, at A35; A Case of Gender
Gerrymandering, WASH. POST, April 26, 2001, at T18; Thomas B. Edsall, Redistricting
May Unseat 6 Democrats, WASH. POST, June 19,2001, at A4.
135. This point deserves further clarification. The point is not that all Republican or
Democratic candidates share similar views, for clearly they do not. Rather, the point is
that, once the field is narrowed down to the leading candidates, the electoral majority
makes its choice in light of all the available evidence, including a candidate's status as an
incumbent.
136. For a recent Article calling attention to the distinction between primaries and
general elections in terms of electoral success, see Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, &
David Luban, Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some
Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1383, 1385 (2001).
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greater significance. On this view, winning individual elections takes
a back seat to winning state and congressional delegations.
Seen from this perspective, one may go as far as to argue that it is
in every constituent's best interest to ensure that her representative
regains her legislative position. Put in stronger terms, to vote against
an incumbent for no better reason than anti-incumbency fever is to
display a deep-seated misunderstanding about the workings of our
political system. The defeat of former Speaker Tom Foley in 1994
epitomizes this view. To put it mildly, Foley brought things to his
districts that less influential representatives did not.137  Clearly,
incumbents benefit their constituents and their states generally. In
response, states have what might come close to a moral obligation in
ensuring that their incumbents remain in powerful positions for as
long as possible.
In response, one may still argue that the constituents should have
the choice to keep or replace an incumbent, a choice that the
redistricting process is said to take away. This position equates the
representative to the entrenched incumbents in the classic
malapportionment cases of the 1960s. 138 Further, a critic might also
complain that many congressional seats are so safe that challengers
cannot even raise money to run a campaign against the given
incumbent. Although these criticisms contain some validity, they fall
short. To be sure, incumbents hold a decided advantage during
electoral contests;139 the crucial question is why. The obvious first
answer is the fact that the very notion of incumbency protection, by
definition, is expected to provide electoral advantages to their
intended beneficiaries. And yet, in response, it is not entirely clear
whether redistricting is as effective in achieving the goals attributed to
it. In fact, researchers have uniformly argued against the general
effectiveness of redistricting in protecting incumbents. 4° Instead,
137. See Robert T. Nelson, If Foley Goes, So Goes His Clout in House, SEATTLE
TIMES, Oct. 26, 1994, at B1. This is not to say that his constituents did not appreciate his
degree of influence in Washington. In fact, when asked, close to thirty percent of residents
in his district thought that whoever replaced Foley would immediately become House
Speaker. See id.
138. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
333 (1962).
139. See Gary C. Jacobson, The 1994 House Elections in Perspective, in MIDTERM:
THE ELECTIONS OF 1994 IN CONTEXT 1-20 (Philip A. Klinkner ed., 1996); Andrew
Gelman & Gary King, Estimating Incumbency Advantage Without Bias, 34 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 1142 passim (1990).
140. See BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 134, at 1-16; see also LARRY M. SCHWAB, THE
IMPACT OF CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING 153-62 (1988)
(concluding that redistricting "is not an important factor in the success or failure of
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other factors have been attributed to the high rate of incumbent
success, such as prior campaigning experience and name recognition,
which in turn help incumbents attract more contributions; the general
decline of ideology; the franking privilege; and constituency service.14 '
Third, the notion of incumbency protection (and gerrymandering
in general) demands the use of predictive factors, some of which will
fail to perform as expected. 42 That is to say, to protect incumbents is
to place registered voters in districts along party lines and to assume
that they will vote in accordance with their prior designation. Taken
further, and as Justice Stevens argues, "[ilt is neither irrational, nor
invidious ... to assume that a black resident of a particular
community is a Democrat if reliable statistical evidence discloses that
97% of the blacks in that community vote in Democratic primary
elections." 143 This is simply a prediction, grounded in a strong factual
record. This is not to say that the prediction will always come true.
More importantly, and as Justice Stevens explains, redistricters tread
a very thin line; a mistake in this area could prove rather costly. He
writes:
To the extent that a political prediction based on race is
incorrect, the voters have an entirely obvious way to ensure
incumbents in most elections"); Charles S. Bullock, Redistricting and Congressional
Stability, 1962-72, 37 J. POL. 569 (1975) (concluding that redistricting has a very small
impact in the reelection of incumbents). But see Alison Mitchell, Redistricting 2002
Produces No Great Shakeups, N.Y. TIMES, March 13,2002, at 20A.
141. See, e.g., GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
(1996); GARY C. JACOBSON & SAMUEL KERNELL, STRATEGY AND CHOICE IN
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 19-34 (2d ed. 1983); John Ferejohn, On the Decline of
Competition in Congressional Elections, 71 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 166 (1977); Morris P.
Fiorina, The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It, 71 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 177 (1977).
In Davis v. Bandemer, for example, Judge Pell wrote in dissenting from the lower
court's opinion:
Most likely, under these circumstances, factors other than political
gerrymandering caused the House and Senate race results to be skewed in
relation to the base Democratic voting strength statewide. The personality of the
particular candidates and the specific political issues of the day may explain the
small disparity between percentages.
Davis v. Bandemer, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1502 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (Pell, J., dissenting), rev'd,
478 U.S. 109 (1986).
142. This is not to say, to be clear, that incumbents will fail to achieve reelection, for
incumbent reelection rates are close to one-hundred percent. It is to say instead that the
crafting of district lines is a predictive enterprise and the assumptions in use are not always
accurate. See BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 134, at 9 ("[P]artisan gerrymandering is, to say
the least, an inexact science. In an era in which party loyalty has been steadily declining, it
is hard to predict whether a change in district composition will necessarily lead to a change
in partisan composition.").
143. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,1031 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that such irrationality is not relied upon in the future: Vote
for a different party. A legislator relying on racial
demographics to ensure his or her election will learn a swift
lesson if the presumptions upon which that reliance was
based are incorrect. 144
In this vein, think also about what it means to respond to the
general argument against incumbency protection with the view that
constituents, not redistricters, should hold the fate of the election in
their hands. Such an argument first presupposes a passive,
uninformed electorate unable to make up its own mind; after all, the
claim is that incumbents are entrenched beyond the power of any
constituency to dislodge them.45  It further presupposes a
redistricting craftsmanship of the highest order for, on this argument,
electoral outcomes are determined prior to the election itself. This
general proposition takes a view of the American voter that I am
unwilling, without more, to accept. More damning yet, this argument
puts forth very little evidence. In looking to the recent redistricting
histories of Texas, Virginia, and Indiana, to name a few, it becomes
immediately obvious that those in charge of the redistricting process
in the early 1990s were often unable to hold their advantage until the
next census. Clearly, electoral control through redistricting is an
uncertain proposition at best.
B. The Standard Elsewhere: Administrative Law and the APA
The common understanding is that Justice Brennan's opinion for
the Court in Baker did not provide standards even while remanding
the case to the lower court for consideration. 46 The Court did
intimate that standards were available; in fact, they were "well-
developed and familiar."' 47 Put simply, lower courts were directed to
144. Id. at 1032 n.29 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see David Mayhew, Congressional
Redistricting: Theory and Practice in Drawing the Districts, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE
1970s, supra note 104, at 277 ("[P]arties with absolute control over districting tend to be
very greedy. A controlling party normally concedes a minimum of very safe districts to
the opposition and then tries to salvage as many as possible for its own adherents. In this
later effort there is a tendency to spread electoral resources too thinly.").
145. Cf. Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of "Informed Voter" Ballot
Notations, 85 VA. L. REv. 1538, 1541 n.30 (1999) ("My assumption in this Article is that
most citizens will continue to behave as civic slackers, despite the hopes of the more
idealistic reformers."); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance
Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893, 903 (1998) (contending that most individuals are civic
slackers, disinterested in "substantive policy arguments and ideas").
146. Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH.
L. REv. 213, 258 (1991); see, e.g., Comment, Baker v. Carr and Legislative
Apportionments: A Problem of Standards, 72 YALE LJ. 968, 969-70 (1963).
147. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,226 (1962).
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determine whether the given discrimination reflected "no policy, but
simply arbitrary and capricious action."'" This Article has argued
that the Court was pointing lower courts towards rationality review.
This section takes the Court's language seriously, particularly its
reference to arbitrariness and capriciousness. This is precisely the
language employed by the courts in the administrative law context.
Before turning to the lower courts and their handling of post-Baker
claims, then, this section looks for guidance in the Court's
administrative law jurisprudence. To be clear, I use this example
simply as an illustration of the interaction between courts and policy-
makers that I envision in the redistricting context, nothing more. On
these terms, the analogy proves instructive.49
According to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),
reviewing courts shall "hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be... arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'150 The
Supreme Court has made clear that this standard is quite narrow.'5' It
is a deferential standard of review, designed to ensure that
administrative agencies are given ample room to carry out their
statutory duties. As such, agencies are presumed to have carried out
their duties in a reasonable way. In turn, those who challenge an
agency's decision have the burden of showing that the agency
behaved unreasonably, that is, that its action was "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion."
Seen this way, it is immediately clear that judicial review of
agency decisions will hinge on the reasons given for the agency's
actions. In essence, an agency must furnish a "rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made." 52 This is not to say
that the court may substitute its judgment for the agency's, nor may
the court invoke reasons for the agency's action that the agency itself
has not provided."5 However, an agency's decision need not be
148. Id.
149. The analogy need not be taken too far, of course, and I do not intend to do so
here. After all, in the administrative context, Congress established the level of review
while delegating its own rule-making powers. No such external guidance exists in the
redistricting context, other than the Court's own doctrinal precedent. This is to say only
that the analogy is not perfect in all respects, yet instructive all the same.
150. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
151. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285
(1974).
152. Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).
153. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,416 (1971).
154. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
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completely clear, for the court will uphold the decision if the path
taken by the agency may be reasonably discerned.155 In turn, an
agency rule is deemed arbitrary and capricious
[i]f the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for
its decisions that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise." 6
In this way, one may see the "arbitrary and capricious" standard
in the administrative context as a way by which courts afford agencies
the necessary room to carry out their duties while the courts retain a
semblance of control. While courts will take a close look and
scrutinize agency decisions, the arbitrary and capricious standard will
ensure that decisionmaking remains in the hands of those whom
Congress intended.
This approach to judicial review resonates with the approach
taken in the redistricting context. Under APA rules, control of the
decision-making process remains in agency hands. Similarly, the
Supreme Court has often stated that redistricting remains in the
hands of state legislatures. 5 7 In either context, then, the question is
one of degree: how much review is acceptable in light of prior
commitments about decision-making authority? In the administrative
context, decision-making authority clearly remains with the agencies,
whose decisions will be overturned only when the reasons provided in
defense of the policies in question fail a rather moderate test. More
specifically, the Court has interpreted the APA to ensure that the
choice between conflicting policy interests remains with the agency.
In contrast, the Court has been much more intrusive in the
redistricting context. Since the advent of Reynolds v. Sims and its
progeny, federal courts have been quite aggressive when evaluating
redistricting plans. It need not be this way. In keeping with the
administrative analogy, federal courts may ask state legislatures to
proffer reasons for the challenged districting plans.58 These need not
155. See Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581,595 (1945).
156. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983).
157. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
158. See Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471, 477-78 (D. Colo. 1962) ("We recognize
that a statute is presumed constitutional .... The population statistics presented by
plaintiffs and challenged by no one show the disparities [that] are of sufficient magnitude
to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination which rebuts the presumption.
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be good reasons, the best reasons, or even the reasons the Court
would cite; rather, a reasonable connection must be established
between the plan under attack and the reasons given for its
implementation. 5 9 This was something, I argued previously, that the
Tennessee legislature in Baker v. Carr could not do.
III. THE LOWER COURTS AT WORK: REDISTRICTING AND
RATIONALITY POST-BAKER
In reference to the post-Baker decisions WMCA, Inc. v. Simon6 '
and Scholle v. Hare,'6' Alexander Bickel wrote that "[t]he rationality
test led nowhere; and within the year the Supreme Court abandoned
it."'62 This is the same test advocated in this Article, the test that the
Court soon eschewed in Gray v. Sanders and subsequent cases.163 Of
Accordingly, the defendants [must demonstrate] some rational basis for these
disparities."). The Maryland Court of Appeals noted,
[T]here is a strong implication in the Baker decision that there must be some
reasonable relationship of population, or eligible voters, to representation in the
General Assembly, if an apportionment is to escape the label of constitutionally-
prohibited invidious discrimination. The State is, of course, to be allowed every
reasonable latitude in such relationship, and any discrimination therein "will not
be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."
Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 180 A.2d 656, 668 (Md. 1962), rev'd,
377 U.S. 656 (1964) (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,426 (1961)).
Of note, this was exactly the approach proposed by Solicitor General Cox during
the Baker litigation. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 14, at 339
("State legislation dealing with legislative apportionment must be measured by tests of
reasonableness like other state legislation."); id ("Such legislation must be 'rooted in
reason' and must not create classifications so arbitrary and unreasonable as to offend the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also id at 347 ("If the disparity is gross
and there is no alternative remedy provided by the state, the burden of providing a
rational explanation should shift to the state. If the state has a reasonable justification,
even a significant disparity should not be unconstitutional.").
159. See, e.g., Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 837 (1983) (upholding Wyoming's
reapportionment plan with a maximum deviation of 89% due to its desire to allocate one
representative to a county "the population of which is considerably lower than the average
population per state representative"); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 325 (1973)
(upholding a state redistricting plan with 16.4% maximum deviation grounded on "the
state's policy of maintaining the integrity of political subdivision lines"); Abate v. Mundt,
403 U.S. 182, 187 (1971) (upholding a maximum range of 11.9% on the basis of the
justification provided--"the long tradition of overlapping functions and dual personnel in
Rockland County government"-and "the fact that the plan before us does not contain a
built-in bias tending to favor particular political interests or geographic areas").
160. 370 U.S. 190 (1962).
161. 369 U.S. 429 (1962).
162. Bickel, supra note 104, at 64; see Karlan & Levinson, supra note 93, at 1201
(explaining that Justice Brennan's assertion in Baker proved to be wrong, as the Court
"developed a set of rules that were uniquely applicable to voting rights").
163. 372 U.S. 368 (1963); see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
interest to me are the reasons why the Court did not pursue this test
further, but shelved it without giving the courts a chance to develop
an adequate response. According to Bickel, "the test led nowhere."
Neither Simon nor Scholle made explicit use of it. In both cases, the
Court vacated and remanded to the lower courts in order to decide
the issue under Baker. In light of Justices Clark's and Stewart's
respective concurrences in Baker and Scholle, one may sensibly
conclude that the Court had in fact set out a standard, a rational basis
standard." Why the Court did not follow through with this standard
is the central question of the Court's reapportionment revolution.
This Part turns to a variant of that question. At the onset, I must
confess that I do not have a clear, definitive answer for the Court's
apparent interpretive turn. One may say with some confidence that
the change in Court composition allowed the Brennan camp to carry
out its redistricting goals further than they were allowed to do in
Baker.6 This Part does not explore this particular proposition
avenue. Instead, it looks to the Court's mandate in Baker as
subsequently interpreted by the lower courts. This Part concludes
that lower courts handled the difficult issues thrust onto their dockets
with aplomb and much thoughtfulness. In so concluding, this Part
implicitly questions the Court's subsequent move to the
equipopulation principle, and particularly its severe application as
seen in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler66 and Wells v. Rockefeller.167
164. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109,149 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
165. Cf.'SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 252.
166. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
167. 394 U.S. 542 (1969); see Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Court, the People, and "One
Man, One Vote," in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970s, supra note 104, at 7, 11 ("Wielding
one man, one vote, like a meat-ax, the Court has not been content only to lop off extreme
population malapportionment. It has come close to subordinating all aspects of political
representation to one overriding element-absolute equality of population in all
legislative districts."). Ward Elliot writes,
The Reapportionment Revolution does represent a triumph of administrative
policy in the sense that it had fitted almost every state with wooden legs in the
space of only a few years, but it is the triumph of Equal Representation for Equal
Numbers only if you like wooden legs-and that must be regarded (as Andrew
Hacker told us in 1965) as a question of aesthetics.
Ward Elliot, Prometheus, Pandora, and Procrustes Unbound: The Political Consequences
of Reapportionment, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 474, 492 (1970); see also Karcher v. Daggett, 462
U.S. 725, 774 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("[N]o one can seriously contend that.., an
inflexible insistence of mathematical exactness will serve to promote 'fair and effective
representation.'... Such sterile and mechanistic application only brings the principle of
'one man, one vote' into disrepute."); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 510 (1968)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (complaining that apportionment "is far too subtle and
complicated a business to be resolved as a matter of constitutional law in terms of sixth-
grade arithmetic"); PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
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A. Tennessee, Inaction and Rationality
This first section applies the "arbitrary and capricious" test to
Baker's facts. In returning to this particular context, I wish to address
one of the most difficult questions raised by many critics. In essence,
the issue is whether the Tennessee plan reflects a legislative policy or
none at all. According to Justice Clark, it is the former. As he wrote
in his concurring opinion, "If present representation has a policy at
all, it is to maintain the status quo of invidious discrimination at any
cost."" Yet, the answer might be a lot more complex than that for,
as Justice Harlan contends in his dissent, inaction is the same as
action, and Tennessee's policy is clearly aimed at the retention of
rural representation. 16 9  Thus, how should a court distinguish
incumbency protection from what went on in Baker and related
cases? That is to say, how can one reconcile the argument that Baker
was rightly decided with the position that incumbency protection is a
legitimate state interest?
This section begins by looking to the Baker litigation on remand
from the Supreme Court.1Y0 During a post-Baker pretrial conference
post-Baker, the state Attorney General advised the district court that
the Governor was preparing to call a special session of the Tennessee
legislature to respond to the Baker ruling.' In this light, he moved
for a stay of the proceedings in order to give the General Assembly
time to act. The district court set June 11, 1962 as the date for the
next hearing. 2 In the meantime, the General Assembly convened in
WARREN COURT 92 (1970) (arguing that, "[e]xcept as an exercise in arithmetic," no
justification exists for the course the Court has taken); Robert Bork, Comments to Chapter
4, in THE JUDICIARY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 110, 110 (Leonard J. Theberge ed.,
1979) ("I don't think Baker v. Carr was wrongly decided, except in the sense that it led
eventually to the formulation of the one man, one vote doctrine."); Michael M. Uhlmann,
The Supreme Court and Political Representation, in THE JUDICIARY IN A DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY, supra, at 91-109 (offering a stinging critique of reapportionment cases, and
specifically their one-person, one-vote standard). In light of its unintended consequences,
some have gone as far as to label one person, one vote a constitutional "tragedy." See
Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, Constitutional Farce, in CONSTITUTIONAL
STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 180, 183-86 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).
168. Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186,258 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring).
169. See id at 336 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Bickel, supra note 46, at 43
("Rationality-the presence of some policy, the absence of 'simply arbitrary and
capricious action'--sounds good, but aside from temper tantrums, it chases its own tail.
Most apportionments represent the rational pursuit of a policy if the Court is willing to
allow the policy to be pursued.").
170. Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
171. Id. at 343.172. Id. at 343-44.
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special session and enacted two separate reapportionment acts, for
the state house and state senate respectively. The Governor
approved both acts on June 7.173
In turning to its analysis of the relevant equal protection
doctrine, the district court began with the widely accepted contention
that the Supreme Court had not "specif[ied] exact standards or
criteria" for examining the case. 74 Rather, the Court had intimated
the existence of "certain guidelines" that would apply to the 1962
reapportionment. 175 This claim immediately proved to be a curious
one, for the district court developed its test by looking not only to the
majority opinion but to all three concurring opinions as well. In so
doing, the court developed the following test: "Do the statutes
establish classifications predicated upon a rational basis, or are they
utterly arbitrary and lacking in rationality?"'176  This is, not
surprisingly, Justice Clark's test.
Once developed, the court applied this test to both
reapportionment acts. First, the court examined the Act
reapportioning seats to the house of representatives. According to
the court, the Act follows the Tennessee Constitution in
reapportioning its seats in accordance with the ratio of qualified
voters while also allowing one member in counties with two-thirds of
this ratio.77 "Such a state plan for distribution of legislative
strength," the court concluded, "at least in one house of a bicameral
legislature, cannot, in our opinion, be characterized as per se
irrational or arbitrary."'78 As the court explained a few sentences
later, "[w]e find no basis for holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
precludes a state from enforcing a policy which would give a measure
of protection and recognition to its less populous governmental
units.' 79
Second, the court turned to the Act reapportioning the state
senate. This piece of legislation did not fare quite so well. Put
simply, the court could not discern any sensible explanation for the
adopted classifications. In reaching this conclusion, it is important to
note that the district court looked carefully to the facts in question in
173. Id. at 344.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 345.
177. Id.
178. IM.
179. Id. at 346.
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its attempt, ultimately futile, to discern a rational redistricting plan. 80
To begin, the plan did not even attempt to reach equality or even
substantial equality in population; neither did the plan create some
semblance of equality in terms of district area.'8' Further, the plan
could not be explained in terms of geography or demography.'8
Finally, the plan could not be explained on a theory of representation
for governmental units or subdivisions.8 3 To the court, this plan had
to be classified under Justice Clark's "crazy quilt" standard.' 4 It
simply made no sense.18 5
In rejecting this plan as it did, the district court must have
ultimately rejected a fairly powerful objection to the initial
justiciability ruling in Baker. As Justice Frankfurter argued in his
caustic dissent in Baker, "What Tennessee illustrates is an old and still
widespread method of representation-representation by local
geographical division, only in part respective of population-in
preference to others, others, forsooth, more appealing. Appellants
contest this choice and seek to make this Court the arbiter of the
disagreement."1 86 Justice Harlan similarly argued that "the foremost
apparent legislative motivation has been to preserve the electoral
strength of the rural interests notwithstanding shifts in population."'"
On this view, legislatures may legitimately pursue the goal of
incumbency protection. Thus the predicament: state legislatures may
seek to protect incumbents, and Tennessee was attempting to do
exactly that when refusing to reapportion its state18s How can Baker
be justified?
180. ML (contending that the plan "is devoid of any standard or rational plan of
classification which we are able to discern").
181. IM
182. Id at 347.
183. Id
184. Id at 346-47.
185. A quick look at the relevant numbers told the story. Id at 347-48.
186. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see Bickel,
supra note 46, at 43-44 (complaining that "[m]ost apportionments represent the rational
pursuit of a policy if the Court is willing to allow the policy to be pursued," even in Baker).
187. Baker, 369 U.S. at 348 (Harlan, J., dissenting); cf. Clark v. Carter, 218 F. Supp.
448, 451 (E.D. Ky. 1963) ("That the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution does not
deny a State, in the establishment of Congressional Districts, the power to assure a proper
diffusion of political initiative as between its thinly populated counties and those having
concentrated masses [is] no longer open to dispute.").
188. In protecting incumbents, Tennessee was also maintaining its existing advantage
for rural counties. And in fact, these goals may not be understood independent of one
another. Clearly, legislators were interested in their own political survival. This would
have remained true even if the existing redistricting plan favored urban districts instead.
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This is a difficult question, far more difficult than it may appear.
It was difficult enough for the Court to ignore it altogether in Baker.
In his contribution to this symposium, Guy Charles offers a possible
way out of this quandary.8 9 To be sure, one must concede that the
Tennessee legislature was pursuing a very rational course of action.
One encounters very little debate on this point. The problem raised
by the legislators' chosen course of action was their exaltation of one
particular value-incumbency protection-at the expense of all
others. This they may not do. For a useful doctrinal referent, think
of the recent racial gerrymandering cause of action begun by Shaw v.
Reno."9 It was in Shaw that the Supreme Court developed what has
come to be known as the "expressive harms" doctrine. As
interpreted by its leading theorist, Richard Pildes, a redistricting plan
violates constitutional norms when the legislature subordinates all
values in favor of its preferred value.' He labels this problem "value
reductionism in public policy."'9 This happens, he explains, when
"policymakers have transformed a decision process that ought to
involve multiple values-as a matter of constitutional law-and
reduced it to a one-dimensional problem." 193  With particular
reference to the facts in Shaw, Professor Pildes interprets the Court's
decision to implicate only those redistricting plans in which race is the
dominant value in disregard of any other. 9 4 This is precisely what a
legislature may not do.
It is exactly what went on in Tennessee prior to Baker. The
legislature had refused to redistrict for quite some time, yet we can
easily surmise the legislators' hesitancy. Plain and simple, their
inaction can easily be attributed to their desire to remain in office.
Their claim is a variant of modern incumbency protection claims.
The difference between these modem claims and the claim in Baker,
however, is that incumbency protection became the sole redistricting
value in Tennessee. In this way, it may be said that the plan violated
constitutional norms irrespective of the specific standard in question.
189. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics:
Reflections on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, passim
(2002).
190. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
191. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts,"
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92
MICH. L. REV. 483,500 (1993).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. In offering this view, I must emphasize that I do not take a position on its
merits, at least not here.
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More specifically, under the standard I have in mind, a reviewing
court would look at the facts in Baker and evaluate the state interests
in support of the plan. Tennessee did not proffer any. Rather, this
was a classic lockup, whereby the rural interests refused to give up
their preferred status in the legislature. Put more abstractly, as
Justice Harlan does in his dissent in Baker, the state's action may be
interpreted as pursuing a legitimate state interest, particularly the
part about geographic representation. Difficulties arose when this
value became the only value at issue. In refusing to redistrict for over
fifty years, any defense to their redistricting plan lost saliency and one
value overrode all others, implicating constitutional concerns.
This understanding of the values at stake and the doctrinal
posture post-Baker received a clearer exposition in Reynolds v.
Sims.195 Prior to Reynolds, it is instructive to note that courts and
commentators alike often pointed to population disparities as
probative evidence of the arbitrariness of the redistricting plan under
consideration.'96 This is to say, quite simply, that population always
played a leading role in redistricting matters. Reynolds did not alter
this reality but simply made explicit what had remained implicit up to
that time. In this vein, Reynolds makes clear that redistricters have
much flexibility in crafting the plans of their choice: "For the present,
we deem it expedient not to attempt to spell out any precise
constitutional tests. What is marginally permissible in one State may
be unsatisfactory in another, depending on the particular
circumstances of the case."' 97 Only when the plan fails to reflect a
number of legitimate constitutional values, but one value is elevated
above all others, will rationality review apply.
B. The Lower Courts Respond
This second section moves away from Tennessee and looks to
many of the cases decided in Baker's wake. The focus here is largely
descriptive; that is, if Baker issued no standard, yet courts went on to
decide cases, what did these courts do? How did they decide the
redistricting cases on their dockets? An examination of the lower
courts' work unveils three general themes.
195. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
196. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 258-259 (Clark, J., concurring); see, e.g., Sanders v.
Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Scholle v. Hare, 116 N.W.2d 350 (Mich. 1962);
Lewis, supra note 19.
197. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578.
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1. Looking for Common Threads
First, the lower courts showed a clear deference to the workings
of the legislative process. In Thigpen v. Meyers,1" 8 for example, the
District Court for the Western District of Washington explained:
"Believing, as we do, that redistricting should be accomplished by the
body constitutionally responsible therefor and that the sins of the
fathers should not be visited upon the sons, we are deferring final
action to afford [the state legislature] the opportunity of discharging
its constitutional mandate."'99  The Connecticut District Court
similarly declared: "We repeatedly have stated our hope and
preference that the necessary redistricting of the Senate and
reapportionment of the House be done by the General Assembly
rather than by this Court. We still entertain that hope and
preference."200
In taking this position, courts made clear that deference should
not be interpreted as impotence. The same Connecticut court
continued,
If confronted, however, with a persistent refusal on the part
of the General Assembly to act, we certainly have the
power, and may well be under a duty, affirmatively, by a
plan formulated by this Court if necessary, to order a
redistricting of the Senate and a reapportionment of the
House. We devoutly hope it will not be necessary for us to
exercise that power. If it becomes necessary, we will not
hesitate. 0 '
The Thigpen court similarly wrote that, "[i]f [the legislature] fails,
we, ever conscious of our oath to uphold the Constitution of the
198. 211 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Wash. 1962).
199. Id. at 832; see also Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 349 (M.D. Tenn. 1962)
(expressing confidence in letting the Tennessee legislature enact a reapportionment plan).
200. Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229 F. Supp. 754, 792 (D. Conn. 1964) (per curiam).
Another federal district court noted,
We remain of the same opinion that was expressed in the order setting the
application for hearing, viz.: until the Legislature has had a further reasonable
but prompt opportunity to comply with its duty under Sections 199 and 200 of the
Constitution of Alabama, this Court should take no action not absolutely
essential for the protection of the constitutional rights asserted in the complaint;
and no ruling before the primary elections of May 1962 appears essential.
Sims v. Frink, 205 F. Supp. 245, 247 (M.D. Ala. 1962); see also Moore v. Moore, 229 F.
Supp. 435, 438 (S.D. Ala. 1964) (per curiam) (contending that "[tihe election machinery of
Alabama is presently in operation with respect to the election of congressional
representatives" and that court decisions "demonstrate a feeling of restraint and a
reluctance on the part of the judiciary to fashion specific remedies which should be
fashioned by the legislative branch of government").
201. Butterworth, 229 F. Supp. at 792.
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United States, will unhesitatingly take appropriate action to correct
the inequity."2
Second, some courts used population as a basis for their decision.
They did so in two ways. Some courts looked ahead to the adoption
of the equipopulation principle. In Moore v. Moore,2 3 for example,
the District Court for the Southern District of Alabama initially held
that the apportionment plan under review met constitutional
proscriptions. On remand, however, the court soon changed its
mind.2°4 In contrast, other courts looked to the past, and particularly
the federal codification of the equipopulation principle in the
Reapportionment Act of 1911.205 The District Court for the Southern
District of Texas did exactly that in Bush v. Martin,°6 even while
conceding that population was not the only legitimate redistricting
parameter.2 °7
Third, many courts applied a rationality test.20 s The language
employed by many courts is particularly relevant in light of the
conventional wisdom surrounding Baker and particularly its lack of
202. Thigpen, 211 F. Supp. at 832.
203. 229 F. Supp. 435 (S.D. Ala. 1964) (per curiam).
204. Id at 438 ("However, in view of the recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court
of the United States, we reach the clear conclusion that the so-called '9-8 plan' is
unconstitutional, in that it violates Article 1, Sec. 2, of the United States Constitution and
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citations omitted).
205. 2 U.S.C. § 3 (1928) (expired upon enactment of Reapportionment Act of June 18,
1929, c. 28, § 22,46 Stat. 21 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 2a (2000)).
206. 224 F. Supp. 499,514 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
207. Id. at 511 ("[A] number of other elements may well be open besides population
[including] geography, area, economic, social, topographical, sociological or political
factors.").
208. See, e.g., Lisco v. Love, 219 F. Supp. 922, 928 (D. Colo. 1963), rev'd sub nom.
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of the State of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964)
(explaining that the Senate apportionment amendment recognizes other factors in
addition to population); Thigpen v. Meyers, 211 F. Supp. 826, 831 (W.D. Wash. 1962)
(contending that "[a]bsolute equality is not essential to [the validity of the challenged
apportionment plan] under the equal protection clause, but a rational basis for the
legislative distinctions is necessary"); WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp. 368, 375
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd sub nom. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (noting
that the state constitution's provisions regarding Assembly Districts "do not appear
arbitrary or irrational"); Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158, 168-69 (N.D. Ga. 1962)
vacated by 372 U.S. 368 (1963) ("We make the test on a consideration of all relevant
factors, and these include rationality of state policy.., whether or not the system is
arbitrary... whether or not the [challenged practice] has a historical basis in our political
institutions, both federal and state."); Watts v. Carter, 355 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Ky. 1962)
("[W]e are unable to say that the solution chosen by the legislature was clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable."); Levitt v. Maynard, 182 A.2d 897, 900 (N.H. 1962) (concluding that
the Senate apportionment method does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because
the court "cannot say that it is without rational basis").
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guidance. A few examples will suffice. In Germano v. Kerner,2 9 the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois looked specifically
to the Court's holding in Baker and concluded that "the Court,
limited by the narrow scope of the issues before it, instructed lower
courts to scrutinize and review apportionment methods presented to
them and in so doing determine the existence or non-existence of a
rational policy or plan as distinct from an irrational, no-policy,
invidiously discriminatory system. '210  The District Court for the
Southern District of Texas reached a similar conclusion in Bush v.
Martin. 1 In that case, the court explained its need to find a standard
of equality in redistricting, and went on to explain:
We accept the approach articulated in a number of cases
that the Supreme Court means to adopt the general guide of
prohibiting 'invidious discrimination.' A good deal is
wrapped up in this formula. An analysis of it involves
subsidiary inquiries along the lines of whether the disparity
is irrational. Shading off, or into, this standard is the
problem of whether the disparity is arbitrary, capricious,
wholly without reasonable foundation, and the like.
This is the formulation, loose as it may be, found at the heart of
the Baker opinion. Or so I argued previously. The Bush court then
took its position to its logical conclusion, and its analysis is worthy of
note. The court continued: "In the end it perhaps comes back to the
question whether there have been actual factors, or perhaps whether
such factors can now be discerned though not previously articulated
in formal Governmental fashion, which sustain or at least explain or
in some measure justify the particular wide arithmetical inequality." '
This search for "formally undisclosed factors" was particularly
pertinent here, as neither the Texas Constitution nor Texas law
provided standards for congressional apportionment. The court then
concluded, in language that captures the essence of the problem:
"We do think, however, that it is a corollary to this that 'invidious
209. 220 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1963), rev'd, 378 U.S. 560 (1964).
210. Id. at 235.
211. 224 F. Supp. 499 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
212. Id. at 510; see Lisco v. Nichols, 208 F. Supp. 471,476 (D. Colo. 1962) (arguing that,
because Baker did not provide standards, "the body of case law construing the Equal
Protection Clause applies," and "[iut is, of course, axiomatic that absolute equality
between classes is not essential to validity under the Equal Protection Clause, but a
rational basis for the legislative distinctions is necessary"); Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp.
885, 891 (W.D. Okla. 1962) ("An actionable deprivation results only from an invidious
discrimination-a disparity without rationality.").
213. Bush, 224 F. Supp. at 510.
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discrimination' is something more than numerical disparity. The
problem, in short, is more profound than that of arithmetic.
214
2. Examples
The previous section was intended to provide a general picture of
the common responses to the Supreme Court's decision in Baker.
This next section looks much more carefully at the reapportionment
dynamics in three states where courts played a central role 15 In
particular, this section provides a much more detailed snapshot of the
interaction between the Supreme Court in Baker and the lower courts
in charge of implementing Baker's promise. In light of this Article's
larger theme, it is fair to say that the lower courts did not disappoint.
a. The Georgia Trilogy
The first case in what soon became known as Baker v. Carr's
"prodigious progeny"216 came from the state of Georgia. This was
Sanders v. Gray,217 a case that raised yet another challenge to the
state's County Unit System.218 The doctrinal climate post-Baker
made Sanders a much better conduit through which to test the
constitutionality of this system. The three-judge district court
accepted the invitation.
The court began its analysis with a preliminary discussion about
the history of the County Unit System as well as a review of prior
litigation 19 The court also restated the now-settled questions of
jurisdiction, standing, and justiciability.220 This was all perfunctory, of
course, for the only issue in the case was, as before, whether the
County Unit System violated the Equal Protection Clause. Put this
way, it becomes immediately clear that this case raises exactly the
214. Id.
215. A note on my choices might prove helpful. I chose the example of Georgia due to
the extent of the litigation there. Looking to Georgia provides telling contrasts about
what a court might deem arbitrary in one context versus non-arbitrary in another. My
choices of Michigan and New York are far more basic. I chose them only to follow the
litigation that reached the Supreme Court soon after Baker to its ultimate conclusion.
216. Introduction, Some Current Thinking on Voting Rights, 61 MICH. L. REv. 643, 644
(1963).
217. 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962), vacated by 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
218. For previous challenges, see Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916, 916 (1958) (denying
leave to file petition for writ of mandamus); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936, 936 (1952)
(dismissing for lack of a substantial federal question); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277
(1950) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal); Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675, 675 (1946)
(dismissing appeal for injunctive relief).
219. Sanders, 203 F. Supp. at 161-66.
220. Id. at 166-68.
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issue found at the heart of this Article. To wit: how did courts come
to understand Baker's mandate?
The court in Sanders discussed a number of factors it deemed
relevant in this analysis. The Sanders court approached this inquiry
by offering its own reading of the doctrinal guidance provided by
Baker v. Carr. To the court, Baker simply adopted the general test
developed by Justice Douglas in South v. Peters: "Where
nominations are made in primary elections, there shall be no
inequality in voting power by reason of race, creed, color or other
invidious discrimination."'" Applying this test to the matter at hand
thus hinged on the court's understanding of "invidious
discrimination." The district court formulated the following test.
First, it began generally by explaining that this test is comprised of "a
consideration of all relevant factors, and these include rationality of
state policy."'  Second, the court would look to the arbitrariness of
the system.m Third, it would consider whether the system has "a
historical basis in our political institutions."'12 4  Fourth, and
particularly relevant for purposes of court intervention, the court
would examine the existence of a political remedy.m Finally, the
court made clear its awareness of "the delicate relationship between
the federal and state governments under the Constitution. '
In applying these factors to the facts in question, the court
concluded that the County Unit System, "in its present form,"
violated the Equal Protection Clause.27 It did so in two ways. First, it
"fail[ed] to accord the unit of plaintiff a reasonable proportion of the
whole."''t Second, it "fail[ed] to accord the units representing a
majority of the population a reasonable proportion of the whole."2 9
In this particular case, population thus played a central role.
A second challenge arose in Georgia soon after Sanders, this
time to the apportionment of the Georgia General Assembly. The
case was Toombs v. Fortson.3°  In the face of a grossly
malapportioned legislature, where disparities ranged from one
representative for 1,876 persons to three representatives for 556,326
221. Id. at 168 (quoting South, 339 U.S. at 281 (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 169.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 170.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
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persons, the claim was, simply, that population must form the basis of
representation3 1 In analyzing this claim, the district court applied
the Sanders test, and in so doing concluded that the present
reapportionment failed it. First, the court followed Justice Clark's
lead in looking for a rational state policy that would justify the
challenged plan. The court could not find one. Left to conjecture,
the court speculated that "there is no policy but simply a reluctance of
those with grossly disproportionate power over the legislative process
to surrender such power." The court asserted, "This is not a rational,
but rather an irrational, policy. ''232 On this basis, the court further
concluded that the plan was also arbitrary "in any sense of that
term." 233 Second, the court rejected any historical support that might
help legitimize the present apportionment system.
Third, the court asked the lockup question: whether the Georgia
electorate may exact change without judicial intervention. The court
answered this query in the negative. Like Tennessee, Georgia's
constitution does not provide for the process of initiative or
referendum. This did not mean that change could not happen, for the
legislators might properly reapportion the state themselves. As in
Tennessee, however, the court recognized the unlikely nature of this
possibility. It explained,
To argue, as do the defendants here[,I that the plaintiffs
should be remitted to the State Legislature to seek the
redress which they claim is their constitutional right, would
be to expect them to succeed in having those in a
dominating position in the State Legislature voluntarily
surrender their position. The record is barren as to the
likelihood of this occurring.
Finally, the court recognized the sensitive nature of the proposed
action, whereby it would temporarily disrupt the political process in
the state. It remained undaunted, however, for it recognized that the
Supreme Court in Baker had demanded no less.235
A third challenge to electoral practices in Georgia, Wesberry v.
Vandiver,236 focused on congressional districting. In this case, the
district court panel faced a reapportionment inertia of thirty years,
during which the largest district in Georgia had grown to 823,680
231. d at 250.
232. IL at 254.
233. Id
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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people while the smallest had 272,154.z3  In looking at the raw
numbers, the court began by conceding that "the statute here when
enacted reflected a rational state policy to set up the congressional
districts in Georgia with some reasonable relation to population."3 8
The passage of time changed matters. As the court continued, "it
now reflects a system which has become arbitrary through inaction
when considered in the light of the present population of the Fifth
District and as measured by any conceivable reasonable standard."z 9
This finding did not lead the court to the expected outcome, however,
for, on the question of remedies, the court stayed its hand. More
specifically, the court alluded to its earlier decision in Toombs v.
Fortson and in so doing expressed its hope that "the arbitrariness
which we find to be present as the statute relates to the Fifth District
and to the rights of plaintiffs will be corrected by the reapportioned
Assembly." 40  In order to reach this view, the Court read Baker
narrowly, as applying only to state apportionments. When it came to
congressional apportionment, it determined that Colegrove v. Green
remained the controlling precedent.
b. New York
A second example looks to the state of New York, and the case
of WMCA, Inc. v. Simon.241 In Simon, the lower court initially
dismissed the complaint,242 yet the Supreme Court vacated this
judgment and remanded for consideration in light of its decision in
Baker.243 On remand, the lower court looked to Baker, as it had to,
yet struggled to discern a workable standard. To its credit, the court
made its struggle painfully clear: "[W]e are unable to premise an
invalidity of the provisions of the state of New York upon the Baker
v. Carr determination by reason of the absence of applicable
indicia." 4  This was not in any way an understatement; soon after
writing it, the court proceeded to quote from all three concurring
opinions in Baker as well as from Justice Harlan's dissenting
237. See id. at 279.
238. Id. at 282.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. 208 F. Supp. 368 (D.C.N.Y., 1962), rev'd sub nom. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377
U.S. 633 (1964).
242. WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 202 F. Supp. 741, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd sub nom.
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzon, 377 U.S. 633 (1964).
243. WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 370 U.S. 190,191 (1962).
244. Simon, 208 F. Supp. at 372.
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opinion.2 45 This helped little, for the court still remained uncertain
about the proper doctrinal road as paved by Baker.
In order to develop a working test by which to analyze the
reapportionment, the court had one final option. It looked to tests
developed by other courts facing similar questions. In so doing, the
Simon court concluded that tests for "invidious discrimination" had
included the following: the now familiar "arbitrary [and capricious]"
test; whether the reapportionment plan had a historical basis; whether
the electorate had any other remedy; geography; and whether the
court is asked to "invalidate solemnly enacted State Constitutions and
laws. 246
Based on these criteria, the court upheld the New York plan.
First, the court concluded that the state provisions in question were
not arbitrary.247  Further, these provisions were "historic in
character""24 and sought to properly diffuse political power between
urban and rural counties. Finally, the ten most populous counties in
the state could control a constitutional convention and the provisions
in question were "solemnly ratified ' 249 by the voters of the state. For
these reasons, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to
show the existence of "invidious discrimination."
c. Michigan
The state of Michigan provides a final example. In Scholle v.
Hare, 0 the Michigan Supreme Court considered its state's
apportionment statute in light of Baker v. Carr. Previously, the court
had concluded that the plan under consideration, and particularly its
senatorial districts, lacked a "rational, reasonable, uniform, or even
ascertainable nondiscriminatory legislative purpose."'' 51 No new
information led the state court to change its collective mind. More
specifically, the court held that under both the Fourteenth
Amendment and the state's own pledge for the "protection of equal
laws," the maximum deviation for the arrangement of state senatorial
districts was two to oneP 2 On this rendition, population remained a
driving force; it just didn't require the subordination of all other
redistricting values.
245. See id. at 372-73.
246. Id at 374.
247. Id at 374-76.
248. Id at 378.
249. Id at 379.
250. 116 N.W.2d 350 (Mich. 1962).
251. Id at 353.
252. See id at 355-56.
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EPILOGUE: THE COURT STRIKEs BACK
Two terms after deciding Baker v. Carr, the Court put an end to
the experimentation. In Reynolds v. Sims,53 the Court addressed a
set of facts similar to those in Baker and Colegrove. The Alabama
legislature had refused to draw new district boundaries since 1900.
As a result, by 1960, the population variances were staggering, some
reaching a ratio of forty-one to one in the state senate, sixteen to one
in the state house.14
In response to these figures-figures, I must add, that the Court
had seen before-the Court attempted to provide a working
constitutional standard. Its language is worth quoting at length.
State legislatures are, historically, the fountainhead of
representative government in this country.... But
representative government is in essence self-government
through the medium of elected representatives of the
people, and each and every citizen has an inalienable right
to full and effective participation in the political processes of
his State's legislative bodies. Most citizens can achieve this
participation only as qualified voters through the election of
legislators to represent them. Full and effective
participation by all citizens in state government requires,
therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice in
the election of members of his state legislature. Modern and
viable state government needs, and the Constitution
demands, no less0 5
This is the language of an activist Court, no doubt. This is also
the language of a Court committed to a majoritarian paradigm,
whereby a majority of the people must control policy outcomes. I do
not quibble with that conclusion. Rather, I am particularly interested
in how the Court's language softened almost immediately, implicitly
acknowledging the complexities of the task at hand:
By holding that as a federal constitutional requisite both
houses of a state legislature must be apportioned on a
population basis, we mean that the Equal Protection Clause
requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to
construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly
of equal population as is practicable. We realize that it is a
253. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
254. For example, Bullock County, with a population of 13,462, and Henry County,
with a population of only 15,286, each had two seats in the state house, yet Mobile County,
with a population of 314,301, had three seats, and Jefferson County, with 634,864 people,
had seven representatives. Id at 545-46.
255. Id at 564-65.
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practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that
each one has an identical number of residents, or citizens, or
voters. Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a
workable constitutional requirement.z6
With this language, the Court signaled a propensity to step back
and let the political branches take the lead in redistricting
controversies. Clearly, the Court did not want to lead here and gave
frequent reminders of that fact. Instead, it appeared to offer a map of
the terrain and flexible parameters.357
This is a charitable rendition of the Court's holding in Reynolds,
to be sure. More realistically, it may be said that the Supreme Court
in Reynolds turned away from the promise of Baker v. Carr." Its
companion cases illustrate this proposition much too well. For
example, the Court applied its population principle much more rigidly
than lower courts did, and in the process overturned district court
rulings in New York'59 and Colorado2m as well as a ruling by the
Maryland Court of Appeals.2 61 In doing so, the Court rejected a
number of possibilities a state may wish to see reflected in its
reapportionment plans, including geographical considerations,
traditions, or the balancing of urban and rural interests. The Court
also rejected the federal analogy,2 62 dismissed the issue of legislative
inaction as irrelevant to the larger constitutional inquiry,2 63 and
similarly concluded that the availability of state remedies, such as the
256. 1& at 577; see Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964) ("[T]he proper judicial
approach is to ascertain whether.., there has been a faithful adherence to a plan of
population-based representation, with such minor deviations only as may occur in
recognizing certain factors that are free from any taint of arbitrariness or
discrimination.").
257. The Court also approached the reapportionment cases on a case-by-case, state-by-
state basis. That is, the Chief Justice in Reynolds explained, that "[w]hat is marginally
permissible in one State may be unsatisfactory in another, depending on the particular
circumstances of the case." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964); see Swann v.
Adams, 385 U.S. 440,445 (1967) ("[A] variation from the norm as approved in one State
has little bearing on the validity of a similar variation in another State.").
258. To be clear, I must underscore the fact that I do not object to the Court's
handiwork in Reynolds, and particularly when considering its assurances about the
flexibility of its new standard. Any disagreement I may have with this particular aspect of
the Court's work comes later, when the equipopulation principle became a straight-jacket,
during the 1969 term and later.
259. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633,655 (1964).
260. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713,739 (1964).
261. Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656,676 (1964).
262. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 571-76.
263. Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678,691 (1964).
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initiative and referendum, in no way affected the constitutional
analysis.26
In charting this course, the Supreme Court exalted population-
based representation above all other possibilities. One may criticize
this course of action in many ways, and the dissenting Justices,
particularly Justice Clark and Justice Stewart, do so particularly
well.2 65 With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see that this
doctrinal move has borne significant costs, both doctrinal and
institutional.266 This Article took these costs and criticisms to heart.
In particular, it took the view that redistricting is far more
complicated than a majority of the Court has understood it to be.
The Court was right in entering the famed thicket, to be sure, yet its
role must be far more passive than it has proven to be. In this vein,
this Article argued that the Court got it exactly right in Baker v. Carr;
in imposing a flexible standard-"arbitrary and capricious"-the
Court demanded some care in the crafting of redistricting plans while
also allowing much-needed flexibility. As we celebrate the fortieth
anniversary of Baker v. Carr, it is perhaps time to rediscover its
implicit promise. In light of modern redistricting debates, we should
pay this great case much closer attention.
264. See Lucas, 377 U.S. at 736-37.
265. See id. at 741-44 (Clark, J., dissenting); id. at 744-65 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see
also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 589-625 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
266. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725,728 (1983) (rejecting an apportionment
plan even though the difference between largest and smallest district was only .1384
percent); Karlan, supra note 51, at 256 (arguing that apportionment litigation may lead to
"partisan activity" by judges).
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